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ROBERT P. MOSTELLER t
INTRODUCTION
The perceived misuse of syndrome evidence is a major focus
of criticism of American criminal trials.' "Trash" syndromes, such
as the "Urban Survival Syndrome,"2 and the attempt by Lyle and
Eric Menendez to use syndrome-like evidence of abuse to excuse
the savage killing of their parents attract national attention.3 0th-
t Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1970, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; S.D. 1975, Yale University; M.P.P. 1975, Harvard University. I wish to thank
Professors Linda Ammons, Kate Bartlett, Sara Beale, Craig Callen, David Faigman, Karla
Fischer, Ed Imwinkelried, Randy Jonakait, Ken Kreiling, Peter Lange, Aviva Orenstein,
Roger Park, Myrna Raeder, Chris Slobogin, Eleanor Swift, Andy Taslitz, and Neil
Vidmar for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. According to some critics, defendants or victims appear to claim that a legally
relevant syndrome exists for every imaginable social malady. See, e.g., ALAN M.
DERSHOWIrZ, THE ABUSE ExcusE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVA-
SIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 18-19 (1994). I believe that, generally, claims regarding the
widespread misuse of syndromes and abuse defenses are vastly overstated. See generally
infra notes 113-49 and accompanying text; see also Peter Arenella, Demystifying the
Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 3 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703 (1996); Richard J. Bon-
nie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5 CORNELL J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 1 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Jacquielynn Floyd, Fort Worth Jury Deadlocks on Killings: 'Survival'
Defense Prompts Questions, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Apr. 20, 1994, at 21A; Lori Mont-
gomery, Teen Killer Blames Fear of Other Blacks: His Survival Defense Troubles Neigh-
bors as welt as Legal Experts, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 22, 1994, at IA (describing
"Urban Survival Syndrome" as an intense fear or "a heightened sense of danger created
in areas where the cops don't come when you call and you better look out for your-
self").
3. Although the defense at both Menendez trials was based on abuse, the claim was
more effectively and fully presented at the first, which ended in a mistrial, than at the
second. See Ann W. O'Neill, Menendez Retrial Plays Differently, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1996, at Al. The second criminal murder trial ended with guilty verdicts for both broth-
ers. See Kenneth B. Noble, Menendez Brothers Found Guilty of Killing their Parents,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al.
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er syndromes, such as Battered Child Syndrome, Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, and Battered Woman Syn-
drome, are more widely accepted. Even for this latter group,
however, the scientific validity and dimensions of their legitimate
use remain unclear and controversial.
In this Article, I put syndrome evidence into context as a
type of proof designed, inter alia, to educate jurors about typical
human behavior in response to specified conditions. Important
similarities exist among types of evidence that connect a partici-
pant in a trial to the behaviors of the members of a purportedly
similar group. Some authors have used the term "social frame-
work" to describe this larger class of evidence;5 I prefer the term
"group character.",6
4. Battered Woman Syndrome is also known as "Battered Spouse" or "Battered
Person" Syndrome. Each of these terms has advantages and disadvantages and each may
carry important subtleties in meaning. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circum-
scribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 582, 620 (1996) (arguing against a single gender-neutral terminology
and discourse with respect to battering, which tends to ignore an important element of
context). "Battered person" appears to be a reasonable alternative and would cover non-
traditional relationships and parricide, for example. Some have argued, however, that
when others besides women in domestic relationships are included, the scientific basis for
the syndrome becomes unclear. See Laura Huber Martin, Note, Ohio loins the Majority
and Allows Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 877,
889 n.85 (1992) (recounting the history of Ohio's statute relating to BWS, in which a
gender-neural version of the statute was considered but rejected upon objection in the
state senate that the applicability of the syndrome to men had not been scientifically
established).
I use the term "Battered Woman Syndrome" for three reasons: it is by far the
most extensively used terminology; women are overwhelmingly those who are subjected
to the conditions giving rise to the reactions at issue, see V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting
Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 232 n.5 (noting that over 90% of the victims of domestic
violence are women); and it is generally the label attached to the particular version of
framework evidence I examine.
5. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science In Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559, 559-60, 570 (1987).
6. See Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 85, 109-12. My concept of group character is broader in the types of evidence
covered, see Id, at 85, than Walker and Monahan's concept, see Walker & Monahan,
supra note 5, at 571-83, and I would not limit the method of introduction to jury in-
struction, see Mosteller, supra, at 110-12, as they would. See Walker & Monahan, supra
note 5, at 592. Others have used the "group character" terminology as well. See, e.g.,
Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character
Evidence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1, 25 (1993) ("'Group Character' is a handy label for testimo-
ny in which an explicit comparison is made between the personality traits of an individu.
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The claim that a social phenomenon constitutes a "syndrome"
suggests a particular power for the evidence and a corresponding
need for special scrutiny. The term "syndrome," if it has any use-
ful meaning, indicates a claim that physical or psychological mark-
ers reveal its cause, that it has significant and predictable effects
on perceptions or behavior, or that experts can accurately identify
individuals who fit within its boundaries. If "syndrome" has no
such special meaning, its use is superfluous at best, and it should
be removed from the vocabulary of criminal litigation.
The law regarding admissibility of group character and syn-
drome evidence is complex and conflicting. This confusion results
in large part from the failure of judges and scholars to distinguish
clearly between different uses of such evidence and to separate
claims that a social phenomenon constitutes a syndrome from
more general claims that some form of group character should be
admissible. My argument in this Article is that the principal dan-
gers to accurate factfinding posed by group character evidence
vary considerably among the different uses and claims of such
evidence, and that admissibility standards, including the level of
scientific validity that must support admission, should vary accord-
ingly.
One use of group character and syndrome evidence is to
determine whether criminal conduct occurred, that is, to diag-
nose.7 Another is to establish the reasonableness of conduct ac-
cording to a legal standard. A third is to support credibility by
showing that apparently aberrational conduct was normal for indi-
al and those typical of members of a certain group.").
The term draws attention to the kinship between "group character" evidence and
individual character evidence. I contend that similar general rules for admissibility should
apply to group character evidence-although not to evidence of true syndromes-as apply
to traditional individual character evidence. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
7. When courts examine past events, as they do when guilt or innocence are being
litigated, the task is one of "diagnosis." When courts are looking to the future rather
than the past, the analogous use of syndrome or group character evidence is that of
"prediction" of conduct. The similarity of the task involved when group conduct is used
to determine how a person acted in the past-which I term a "diagnostic" use-and the
task involved when group conduct is used to predict future conduct is well recognized.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1345-46 (1971) (noting that, where the relevance of
probability concepts is concerned, "there is simply no inherent distinction between future
and past events"); Walter & Monahan, supra note 5, at 573-74 (noting that the logic of
inferences about individual behavior derived from group membership is equally valid as
applied to future and past acts).
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viduals who have had certain experiences. Rarely will the scientific
basis of syndrome evidence be sufficient to sustain its most aggres-
sive uses. A syndrome-particularly a psychological syndrome-can
almost never successfully diagnose the causes of criminal conduct
or determine whether that conduct occurred. On the contrary, a
syndrome will rarely have enough specific meaning to give it any
greater power in proving conduct than a more general social
framework or group character evidence. Thus, ambitious claims for
syndrome evidence are generally unsupported.
By contrast, when group character evidence is used for the
limited purpose of supporting the credibility of a witness after that
credibility has been attacked, the evidence is far more likely to be
scientifically valid and sufficiently valuable to justify admission. In
this context, the function of group character evidence is to correct
erroneous stereotypes held by jurors. Both jurors and judges8
(indeed, all people) come to fact determination processes with a
set of life experiences that shape their evaluation of evidence.
These experiences are often simplified into convenient devices,
sometimes called heuristics, that allow humans to categorize obser-
vations quickly and thereby make decisions in a complicated
world.9 When these devices are inaccurate, expert testimony
usefully serves to correct them.
The use of evidence regarding group behavior to correct ste-
reotypes and thereby restore credibility may nevertheless distort
the jury's analysis," even though such use is relatively unprob-
lematic with respect to the requirement of scientific validity.'
8. Although American law assumes that judges, as experienced factfinders, will be
immune to the human frailties presumed to afflict lay jurors, empirical research suggests
that judges are not fundamentally more adept at laying aside erroneous stereotypes than
jurors. See, eg., A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Tressillian Jones, Is the Psychology of
Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITESs Evi-
DENCE 13, 15, 37 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983) (discussing
research that reveals that lawyers and judges scored significantly lower than expert psy-
chologists with regard to variables affecting reliability of eyewitness identifications).
9. See, eg., Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. & SOc'Y REV. 123, 130-31 (1981).
10. Even this limited use of group character evidence constitutes an unusual role for
evidence in American trials. Courts typically assume that the life experiences of jurors al-
low them to make proper judgments about general human reactions.
11. Indeed, all that is required to establish validity of the evidence is a showing of
some degree of common response from a group of similarly situated individuals, rather
than the diagnostic or causal relationship associated with a syndrome. See generally infra
Section I.A.
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Inherent in such evidence is the danger that it will accomplish
more than a correction and will instead distort the jury's view,
albeit in a different direction. Thus, beyond concerns about the
label attached to such evidence, the use to which it is put, and the
issue of scientific validity, evidentiary concerns regarding special
forms of prejudice flowing from group character evidence must be
examined.
The investigation of the above concerns does not lead to the
conclusion that all or even most of what is currently termed "syn-
drome evidence" should be excluded. The generalized form of
such evidence, particularly when used for less aggressive purposes,
provides important assistance to the jury in evaluating evidence.
My argument is principally that the term "syndrome" should not
be used when it has no special meaning, and that the social sci-
ences have not, except in rare instances, sufficiently defined syn-
dromes to provide that term with a special meaning and particular
evidentiary power.
Societal concerns about the excessive use of syndromes in
conjunction with so-called "abuse excuses,"' 2 although not entire-
ly without foundation, are generally exaggerated and not explained
by misuse of syndromes. Rather, such defenses are most success-
ful-prized by some and reviled by others-because of our ambiv-
alent attitudes toward self-help violence, particularly violence di-
rected against "unworthy" victims. 3 Much of our unease is the
product of an excessive focus on sensational criminal prosecutions,
particularly those that pit one social group against another and
may consequently involve an especially controversial form of
group character evidence. 4 Syndromes and group character evi-
dence are not at the heart of these problems.
Another subject of this Article is the increasing impact of
political influences on evidence law. 6 Reaction to the abuse of
12. See DERSHoWrrz, supra note 1, at 3.
13. Within the class of the "unworthy," I include both those who have committed
past acts of violence against the defendant and those whose general behavior or personal
characteristics render them unsympathetic to the average juror.
14. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 489
n.10 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIUNAL TRiALS (1995) and noting that the trials that receive the most
publicity often involve clashes between social groups and a battle between conflicting
images and stereotypes).
15. "Political" is a broad term that includes not only the exercise of self-interested
power by groups but also the process by which a moral component may be identified
1996]
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women and children in particular has led to the revision of evi-
dentiary rules, including some in the field of syndrome evidence,
in a belated effort to make amends for prior societal and legal
insensitivity. Whether future evidence law revisions with origins in
concerns about gender and violence will ultimately improve
factfinding is an open issue. Such changes, however, are more
likely to be properly directed if the political component of recent
changes is recognized openly.
In Part I, I develop a general approach for judging the admis-
sibility of group character evidence. I focus on the specific use of
the evidence, the strong claim of syndrome evidence to describe
and predict perceptions or conduct, and the quality of the science
supporting the syndrome. These issues are interrelated, and recog-
nizing their interconnection explains otherwise confusing judicial
treatment of admissibility. I then examine three major syndromes
in detail. The first two-Battered Child Syndrome and Child Sexu-
al Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)-fit nicely into my
proposed analytical scheme; some formulations of the third-
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)-do not. I argue that the in-
fluence of politics explains the largely unrestrained admissibility of
BWS. I then turn to the frequent judicial exclusion of expert testi-
mony regarding eyewitness identification. Such exclusion can be
explained largely by my general approach to group character evi-
dence but, as with syndrome evidence, political considerations play
an important role in the consistent decisions on admissibility.
In Part II, I evaluate the relationship between the admission
of group character and syndrome evidence and the apparent in-
crease in abuse-based defenses. I note some ways in which such
evidence increases the effectiveness of abuse defenses, and identify
and incorporated into the law. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretative Method and
the Federal Rules of Evldence. A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutlcs, 32 HARV. 1.
ON LEGIS. 329, 353-95 (1995) (arguing that there is never a "single objectively valid
interpretation" of the law, and that statutory interpretations are largely based on political
reasons). Thus, the term is not necessarily pejorative, but its operation is quite different
from either traditional evidentiary analysis or scientific evaluation.
16. I avoid use of the word "reform" when describing changes that affect criminal
litigation because that term connotes improvement. Although many of the changes related
to adjudicating crimes involving violence against women are worthy of being called "re-
forms," most changes in criminal litigation in the near-term will be motivated by little
more than a desire to secure higher conviction rates and harsher punishment, such as
recent changes in federal habeas corpus procedures contained in the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), that
make obtaining relief for violations of constitutional rights more difficult.
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types of cases in which a substantial danger of misuse exists. I
conclude that, although the term "syndrome" should be largely
removed from the legal vocabulary of criminal litigation, syn-
drome-type evidence plays a relatively small role in abuse-based
defenses and can be managed with reasonable controls in those
cases. Finally, I suggest the ways in which my analytical system
should change the law in other areas, and examine the implica-
tions of the explicit recognition that, in admitting syndromes and
other evidence in prosecutions involving violence against women, a
political component is evident.
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SYNDROMES: A RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE LABELING AND USE OF SYNDROME
EVIDENCE AND THE UNDERLYING SCIENTIFIC
QUALITY OF THE SYNDROME
I begin by concentrating on group character evidence offered
under the explicit label of a syndrome. "Syndrome" is an elastic
term as used in the social sciences, and as used in criminal litiga-
tion it has little, if any, specialized meaning. The general definition
of "syndrome" found in Webster's dictionary is: "a group of symp-
toms or signs typical of a disease, disturbance, condition, or lesion
in animals or plants."' 7 Even in medicine, where the term origi-
nated and has been much more carefully developed, the concept is
relatively amorphous."8 In that field, syndromes are contrasted
with diseases with respect to causation; the causes of syndromes
are generally more obscure.19 This obscurity of causes for syn-
dromes serves as a useful starting point in highlighting an impor-
tant distinction between syndromes, or perhaps more properly
between true syndromes, on the one hand, and more generalized
group character evidence on the other.
When courts decide whether to admit syndrome evidence such
as Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, they often ap-
pear to focus in different cases on entirely different issues.
17. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2320 (Merriam-Webster
1986) (emphasis added). The general definition does not indicate an invariant relationship
between a disease or condition and its symptoms.
18. See John E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony Describing Psychological Syndromes, 24





Sometimes admissibility turns on the quality of the research associ-
ated with the syndrome. In other instances the key issue, accord-
ing to the court, is the use to which the evidence will be put. I
contend that the requirements for admission should be (and, for
the most part, are) based on a combination of two basic consider-
ations: 1) the quality of the science, considered in light of 2) the
claims being made for, and the use being made of, the evidence.
My treatment relies on the simple but significant proposition that
the test for "good science" should not be uniform for all uses of
syndrome evidence and group character. Each use of such evi-
dence requires science that is adequate for the task performed by
the evidence; the requirements imposed on the science differ be-
cause the difficulty of the task differs.
In some instances, a high degree of validity is required, either
because of the difficulty from a scientific perspective of accurately
determining the link between the person and the syndrome or the
impact of the syndrome upon conduct, or because of the potential
from an evidentiary perspective for prejudicial misuse of the evi-
dence. Specifically, when group character evidence is used in a
criminal context to determine whether conduct has occurred, such
as whether a child has been sexually abused, the science must be
of the highest quality and should satisfy the standard set out in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' Here, the difficul-
ty of the scientific task is the greatest, and the impact of misguid-
ed expert evidence, in terms of potential prejudice, can be the
most devastating. By contrast, when the group character evidence
is being used for credibility purposes-to correct human misunder-
standings of the apparently unusual and therefore suspicious reac-
tions of a trial participant-the requirements of validity are much
less exacting from a scientific perspective, and the dangers of jury
misuse of the evidence, while real, are typically less grave.
This basic analytical system explains why CSAAS is treated
differently than one version of the Battered Child Syndrome,
discussed below.2 The explanation for the admissibility of Bat-
20. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly
Rule 702, limit the admissibility of proffered scientific evidence by requiring the judge to
determine whether the expert's testimony is scientifically valid and relevant to the facts
at issue). When used for a diagnostic purpose, the syndrome should rest on standard
hypothesis testing and therefore should satisfy Daubert's most rigorous method of scien-
tific validation. See id. at 592-94.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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tered Woman Syndrome, however, is more problematic. When
BWS is used in a domestic homicide as part of a self-defense
claim to establish that the defendant's conduct was reasonable, it
falls between the typical uses of CSAAS and Battered Child Syn-
drome in terms of the difficulty of the scientific and legal issues.
Although scientific support for BWS as a true syndrome is weak,
it is sometimes used in a way that is closer to the difficult task of
determining that conduct occurred than to the simpler one of
refuting an attack on witness credibility.' Consequently, the very
broad admissibility of BWS requires further and different explana-
tion. Finally, this analytical system helps to explain the exclusion
of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications.
A. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Using Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence to Rehabilitate Credibility, Not to
Diagnose
Although conceptually a syndrome might be used diagnostical-
ly-to establish cause-most syndromes, particularly psychological
syndromes, cannot be so employed. This observation leads to an
important difference in the use of syndromes in criminal cases,
illustrated by contrasting CSAAS with another syndrome used in
child abuse cases, Battered Child Syndrome.'
CSAAS was first described popularly by Roland Summit. 4 It
is characterized by five features, principally related to the child's
behavior: 1) secrecy; 2) helplessness; 3) entrapment and accom-
modation; 4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and
5) retraction or recantation.' Most courts now recognize that
CSAAS is not diagnostic, since those five symptoms, either sepa-
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. Although two different syndromes are sometimes given the general label of Bat-
tered Child Syndrome, the one examined here depends upon markers of physical abuse,
not psychological reactions. For discussion of the latter syndrome (which in many respects
is similar to BWS), and its relevance in cases of parricide, see Michael K. Molitor, Note,
The "Battered Child Syndrome" as Self-Defense Evidence in Parricide Cases: Recent Devel-
opments and a Possible Approach, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 237 (1993); Jodlle Anne Moreno,
Comment, Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused Child, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1281 (1989).
24. See Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHiLD ABUSE & NEGLECr 177, 181 (1983).
25. See id. at 181-88.
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rately or in combination, do not point with any certainty to sexual
abuse as the cause of the child's conduct.
2 6
In contrast, Battered Child Syndrome, developed by Henry
Kempe, is diagnostic.27 Although it may be characterized by addi-
tional symptoms, the archetypical symptoms of Battered Child
Syndrome are multiple bone fractures in the legs and arms, at
various stages of healing, and sometimes accompanied by subdural
hematomas. This pattern of injuries does not occur accidentally,
and when these markers are found, the cause is physical child
abuse.29
Explicit in the above discussion, and implicit in courts' ex-
amination of the admissibility of these syndromes, is the require-
ment of a very high degree of scientific validity before a syndrome
will be admitted to show that criminal conduct occurred?0 That
the syndrome or group character evidence increases the likelihood
that a crime was committed is not sufficient. The scientific evi-
dence must deliver a high level of confidence-it must support a
diagnosis,3 not just a suggestion of a result.3 Multiple ratio-
26. See Myers, supra note 18, at 1456-57; see also Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153, 156-60
(1992) (observing that this syndrome has sometimes been used beyond its intended pur-
pose to diagnose abuse). Most courts recognize a basic distinction consistent with the
conclusion that CSAAS is not diagnostic of abuse, excluding such evidence when it is
offered to prove abuse but admitting it for the more limited purpose of rehabilitating a
child's credibility. See, e.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492-99 (Ind. 1995); State v.
J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1203-05 (NJ. 1993); see also Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16,
845 F. Supp. 1342, 1351-53 (D. Neb. 1994) (holding that testimony by two psychologists
and a psychiatrist that child had been abused did not meet Daubert standard), affd, 66
F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
27. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 105 JAMA 17 (1962).
28. See id. at 105-06.
29. See United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[E]vidence of the
battered-child syndrome was ... admissible as evidence of intent and the absence of
accident."); Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 393 (Cal. 1976) (discussing history of Bat-
tered Child Syndrome); see also John E.B. Myers & Linda E. Carter, Proof of Physical
Child Abuse, 53 Mo. L. REv. 189, 190-93 (1988) (defining abuse as "nonaccidental physi-
cal injury"); Myers, supra note 18, at 1454 (stating that a child with Battered Child Syn-
drome is very likely to have suffered nonaccidental injury).
30. See generally Taslitz, supra note 6, at 26-28 (describing the potential uses of
group character evidence in criminal trials).
31. See 1 J.E. SCHMIDT, SCHMIDT'S ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-76
(1992) (describing "diagnosis" as "[t]he determination of what kind of disease a patient is
suffering from, especially the art of distinguishing between several possibilities").
32. See Taslitz, supra note 6, at 26-27. As discussed below, research done "on the
dependent variable" is not satisfactory to determine that features are diagnostic. See infra
notes 43, 63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:'461
1996] SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND POLITICS
nales undergird the requirement of a high level of validity. They
include a recognition of the extreme difficulty of the diagnostic
task, the awe-inspiring nature of scientific evidence, and concerns
similar to ones that animate rules excluding most character evi-
dence about individuals.33 The conclusion to be drawn from this
33. The concern which underlies the general prohibition against receipt of character
evidence is that the jury will take the admittedly relevant evidence of character to be
more powerful than appropriate, and that the defendant should be protected against such
prejudice in criminal cases.
The analogy to the evidentiary principles governing admission of character regard-
ing an individual is important in explaining the admissibility pattern of much group char-
acter and syndrome evidence. At least until the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence
413 and 414, the basic principle regarding the character of the defendant or an alleged
victim was that, when offered to prove conduct, it could be introduced by the defendant
but could not be offered by the prosecution, except to rebut character evidence initially
admitted by the defendant. Positive character for credibility purposes could be offered by
either side once a witness' credibility was attacked. See generally 1 MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE §§ 188, 191, 193, 194 (John W. Strong ed., Practitioner's 4th ed. 1992) (explaining
the general rule of exclusion of character as circumstantial evidence and the exceptions
to this rule: evidence of good character offered by a criminal defendant; evidence of the
character of the victim in cases of assault and murder, and character evidence used to
impeach a witness); see also FED. R. EvD. 404(a) & 608(a). By contrast, the more pro-
bative habit evidence can be introduced by any party. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra, § 195 (discussing the difference between evidence of habit and evidence of charac-
ter and explaining that the former is generally admissible); see also FED. R. EviD. 406.
The limitations on CSAAS are consistent with the preceding principle and consis-
tent with treating social framework testimony as group character generally. See Mosteller,
supra note 6, at 111 (proposing that limitations placed on social framework evidence by
Professors Laurens Walker and John Monahan, see Walker & Monahan, supra note 5, at
581, are similar to individual character evidence because social framework evidence is
essentially a form of character evidence). CSAAS, like character evidence, is not admissi-
ble against the defendant to prove that the crime occurred. However, Battered Child
Syndrome is admissible because the level of scientific certainty makes it far more proba-
tive, like habit evidence, and therefore admissible. See supra notes 27-29 and accompany-
ing text.
This analogy explains why defendant profiles offered to prove criminal conduct are
(and should be) generally excluded, at least until the scientific evidence demonstrates a
highly invariant predictive link. But see Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of
Batterers' Profiles and Expert "Social Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Do-
mastic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 147, 178-87 (1997) (arguing for broader admis-
sibility of data regarding the phenomenon of battering, although not BWS itself, within a
social science framework in the prosecution's case-in-chief). However, the enactment of
Rules 413 and 414 breaks the historical pattern and allows the prosecution to use pro-
pensity evidence in the area of sex crimes to prove the defendant's guilt. See FED. R.
EVm. 413, 414. If that development extends to other areas, the admissibility of group
character evidence offered against the defendant could likewise be changed.
As developed below, the admissibility of CSAAS to rehabilitate credibility fits into
the above described traditional pattern for character evidence. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 35-49. Similarly, defense use of evidence regarding battered women when of-
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discussion is worth repeating: a high degree of scientific validity is
required for "diagnostic" uses of syndrome evidence, and the use
of the evidence determines the degree of validity that is re-
quired. 4 As a corollary principle, use of the term "syndrome"
should be restricted to situations where it possesses the type of
special power that permits diagnosis or a similar predictive or
explanatory capacity.
If a syndrome cannot be used diagnostically, however, as is
true for most, what is its value to the social sciences or in criminal
litigation? It is to describe general reactions to known or assumed
causes." For instance, in child sexual abuse prosecutions, testimo-
ny regarding CSAAS may assist the jury by explaining that many
children who were in fact sexually abused delayed reporting the
abuse or recanted their initial accusations; delay does not necessar-
ily mean, as jurors might ordinarily suppose, that the child's testi-
mony is to be heavily discounted because of the apparently im-
peaching conduct. 6
That the evidence serves a corrective function determines the
issues social science must address. In order for such evidence to
have theoretical value, three propositions must be established.
First, the general public must misperceive the social reality regard-
ing relevant group behavior, a misperception that presumably will
afflict jurors and distort their attitudes. Second, the expert or the
jury must be able to identify when a person is a member of the
fered as group character or framework evidence fits the traditional pattern. See infra note
59 and accompanying text.
34. Courts do not make clear precisely why they impose this higher requirement of
scientific proof. In addition to the reasons noted above, see supra note 33, courts may be
requiring that the expert be able to testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty
that a causal relationship exists, continuing a common law requirement that an expert
must make such a claim regarding his or her opinion. See Edward J. Imwinkeiried, Evi-
dence Law Visits Jurassic Park- The Far-Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court's
Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 67-68
(1995). Or the exclusion may be based implicitly on a balancing of probativity versus
prejudice, or on a belief that if such a claim of scientific certainty cannot be made, the
scientific theory must be lacking validity. See id. at 68-69.
35. See Myers, supra note 18, at 1458.
36. See infra note 38. Some uses of BWS are virtually identical to the generally
accepted use of CSAAS discussed infra. This is true when the evidence is offered by the
prosecution to support the credibility of the battered woman in the prosecution of the
batterer, and when BWS is offered to explain the apparently impeaching conduct of the
complaining witness. See, eg., People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 202-06 (Mich. 1995)
(concluding that prosecutorial use of BWS to support complaining witness exceeded the
proper boundaries because complainant's conduct was not incomprehensible to jurors).
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relevant group (or that identification must be accomplished by
other evidence). Third, consistent, stable, and well-defined group
behavior-perhaps not a "syndrome" but at least "group charac-
ter"-must exist in response to a set of conditions assumed or
proven to be present in the case.
Answering the question of whether a general public misper-
ception exists is theoretically the easiest of the three tasks. Al-
though current research on public attitudes and knowledge regard-
ing the precise "social reality" involved in a case is often not
available,37 in most important areas at least some research has
been done that reveals a basic level of misunderstanding.38 Even
if the research does not resolve the issue, courts often assert a
societal misunderstanding of social reality if the evidence is other-
37. Determining whether public misperception exists involves ascertaining what the
reality is regarding a social condition and what public perception is regarding that same
condition. Finding an accurate measure, particularly a current direct measure, of each is
often not possible. With regard to the latter, not only is the exact state of public
knowledge difficult to determine, it is also likely to change over time and to be internal-
ly inconsistent.
Although only an indirect indicator, a recent Justice Department study raises inter-
esting questions about social reality regarding prosecutions of those charged with
interspousal homicide and about current attitudes, particularly attitudes toward men and
women defendants in such cases. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES (1995).
The study showed that of male defendants in interspousal homicide cases, 46% pleaded
guilty, 41% were convicted, 11% were not prosecuted, and 2% were acquitted. Of the
guilty, 81% were sent to prison, for an average of 16.5 years. Of female defendants, 39%
pleaded guilty, 31% were convicted, 16% were not prosecuted, and 14% were acquitted.
Of the guilty, 57% were sent to prison, for an average of six years. See id. at 1.
Do these figures reflect a rather sophisticated understanding of the social reality of
spousal abuse and interspousal homicide by jurors, judges, and prosecutors? Or do they
reveal the operation of erroneous stereotypes used against men or against women? The
figures suggest that male murderers are generally treated more harshly than females: "In
spouse murder cases, wife defendants were less likely to be convicted and to receive
severe sentences than husband defendants." Id. Beyond that rudimentary point, however,
it is unclear what we can conclude from this data other than that the task of discerning
the accuracy of both social reality and of juror stereotypes is likely to be difficult and
complicated. See Bonnie, supra note 1, at 8-9 (finding in a related set of data, not an
indication that abused women have been given a license to kill their abusers, but rather
an increasing trend in victimization of women).
38. A group of studies have been conducted in a number of areas in which the
researchers follow a general pattern of surveying experts in a field, such as those treating
rape victims, about responses of victims and compare those results to the beliefs of
laypersons. The studies generally reveal significant differences between the beliefs of ex-
perts, which are treated as accurately reflecting social reality, and laypersons. See e.g.,
Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of
Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101 (1988).
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wise deemed admissible 9 In terms of the social science, the
more difficult issues are generally the determination of whether
the trial participant "suffers from" a syndrome and the precise
contours of this syndrome.' When CSAAS is introduced, howev-
er, these latter two issues are typically not difficult due to: 1) the
procedural posture in which CSAAS is offered; and 2) the limited,
largely generic, evidentiary use of the syndrome.
Instead of leading with evidence regarding CSAAS, the prose-
cution customarily begins by eliciting testimony by the child or
other evidence that the defendant sexually abused the child. Then,
in cross-examination, the defendant challenges that accusation
based on apparently impeaching behavior, such as failure to report
39. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984) (asserting that "[tihe
nature . . . of the sexual abuse of children places lay jurors at a disadvantage"); State v.
Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337-38 (Haw. 1982) (declaring that the common experience of ju-
rors provides "a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of [the child]
witness").
My point is not that we have no research results regarding societal misperceptions;
a body of research does exist. See supra note 38; infra note 58. However, this research
rarely covers the precise issues in the case, and such research as exists may be out of
date, particularly for syndromes that are the subject of intense public attention. See Regi-
na A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A
Review of the Literature, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273, 282-83 (1992) (suggesting that
attitudes towards a syndrome may shift under these circumstances). Moreover, courts
rarely analyze the research carefully. Instead, courts cite research casually, perhaps using
such research only when it meets the courts' own stereotypes of a discord between social
reality and public perception. For example, in State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Haw.
1988), the court used the following quotation to justify special treatment for expert testi-
mony regarding credibility of children: "'[C]hild sexual abuse is a particularly mysterious
phenomenon, often involving an unusual cast of characters who are involved in relation-
ships that are seemingly inexplicable to most people"' and cited for the proposition Da-
vid McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 44-45 (1986). However, McCord indicates
elsewhere in his article that although there is scant research on the issue of the disincli-
nation of jurors to believe child witnesses, the one study available concludes that for the
most part potential jurors are surprisingly well informed. Id. at 35. The court, however,
quoted only the above statement that fit its apparent need for support, which does not
rest directly on empirical research, rather than the research findings that suggest a con-
trary conclusion.
40. For example, in discussing expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification
evidence, of principal importance is the fit of the evidence to the case, which is related
to whether a trial participant can be identified as suffering from the syndrome. See infra
Section I.C. With regard to BWS, I contend that admissibility should be problematic for
some uses of that syndrome precisely because both the determination of whether a par-
ticipant suffers from the syndrome and the determination of the relevant contours of the
syndrome may be beyond the present capabilities of social scientists. See infra text ac-
companying notes 74-76.
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the incident promptly.4' Finally, in response,42 the prosecution
offers evidence regarding CSAAS to show that children deter-
mined to have been sexually abused under independent criteria
typically delayed reporting the incident. The instruction to the jury
then states roughly that if the jury otherwise finds that the child
was sexually abused, failure to report the abuse promptly should
not change that judgment because delay is typical of those who
have been sexually abused, and therefore not impeaching.4'
In addition to being offered in a favorable procedural posture,
CSAAS is more easily admitted for credibility purposes because it
makes only minimal claims that hardly require a specially-defined
syndrome. The prosecution does not offer CSAAS to prove that
the child was sexually assaulted by the defendant. Instead, it mere-
ly counters defense impeachment of the child by showing that a
stereotype often fails to fit conduct under circumstances like those
alleged in the case.
The claims based on CSAAS are so general that they can
usually be sustained by a more generic condition-Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). 4 Although the psychological markers of
41. Waiting to admit the group character evidence until after defense attack also aids
indirectly in resolving the first issue of whether societal misperception exists. Presumably
the defense would not have attacked credibility based on variance from a stereotypical
response to abuse unless it believed the jury accepted the stereotype. See Mosteller,
supra note 6, at 120.
42. Typically, the evidence is received as a response by the prosecution to an attack
by the defense. However, courts are either very liberal in their determination of the
defense attack required, see e.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind. 1995) (hold-
ing that either defense discussion or presentation of evidence regarding unexpected child
behavior justifies admission), or they require no per se defense attack at all if the facts
of the case, such as delayed reporting, combined with juror misconceptions, might lead to
incorrect inferences. See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 861-62, 868-71 (Mich.
1995); see also John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litiga-
tion, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 92 (1989) (arguing that although expert testimony to rehabilitate
the child is generally admitted following defense cross-examination, it should be admissi-
ble as soon as the assault begins-even as early as the opening statement).
43. The basic substantive test for admissibility that courts should employ is to ask
whether the jury can honestly be expected to use the evidence principally for credibility
purposes, as opposed to using it as proof that the abuse in fact occurred.
As discussed below in connection with BWS, see infra note 63 and accompanying
text, research limited to the group of children who are believed to have been sexually
abused, which cannot definitively differentiate those children from non-abused children, is
theoretically acceptable when CSAAS is not used for diagnostic purposes. See also supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text. This rehabilitative use of the evidence fits the pat-
tern of admissibility for character evidence of individuals. See supra note 33.
44. PTSD is the term applied by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
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PTSD have not been proven to be diagnostic of the precipitating
event, PTSD's general characteristics are well-established through
observations across a variety of situations, and neither CSAAS nor
anything more specific regarding the reactions of children suffering
from sexual abuse is required in most cases to support the child's
credibility.45 A court need not determine whether the precise di-
mensions of CSAAS, as opposed to PTSD, have been scientifically
established. Indeed, labeling the group reaction a syndrome is
superfluous-at least to the extent that "syndrome" has a meaning
more specific than frequently observed behaviors in a group of
individuals.
Thus, admission is easily justified when independent proof of
abuse is offered in conjunction with limited claims made by
CSAAS, and when CSAAS is used to counter defense impeach-
ment of a child who has exhibited apparently suspicious behavior.
However, dangers of misuse remain, even when CSAAS is used in
this limited fashion. First, instead of having erroneous stereotypes
neutralized, jurors may adopt new erroneous stereotypes that are
overly supportive of the prosecution's position. For example, jurors
may come to believe that a delay in reporting affirmatively proves
that sexual abuse occurred or that all recanted allegations of sexu-
al abuse are true. These new stereotypes may arise as a result of
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to symptoms that may develop following direct
personal experience with an extreme traumatic stressor, such as a threat of death or
serious injury, or a threat to one's physical integrity. The types of traumatic events in-
clude "military combat, violent personal assault (sexual assault, physical attack, robbery,
mugging), . . . natural or manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diag-
nosed with a life-threatening illness." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994). PTSD has six diag-
nostic criteria: 1) the person experienced an extreme stressor and responded through
intense fear, helplessness, or horror; 2) the traumatic event is persistently reexperienced
through nightmares, flashbacks, or similar experiences; 3) the person persistently avoids
stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness by behaviors,
such as inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma or feelings and detachment
or estrangement from others; 4) persistent symptoms of increased arousal are experienced,
including difficulty sleeping or concentrating, or hypervigilance; 5) the symptoms have a
duration of more than one month; and 6) the disturbance causes "clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning."
Id. at 427-29.
45. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psycho-
logical Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2027,
2036-51 (1994); cf. Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert
Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 713-24
(discussing the use of either Rape Trauma Syndrome or PTSD to explain the apparently
unusual post-assault conduct of the alleged victim).
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a number of factors, including the apparent certainty of expert
scientific testimony about syndromes and the use of terminology
that suggests scientific proof of the crime.46 Second, demonstrat-
ing that there are groups of people who exhibit conduct or reac-
tions similar to the claimed behavior of the witness, victim, or
defendant may appear to corroborate the content of the
participant's story.47 The jurors may come to believe that because
that story resembles the experiences of many other people, it is
likely to be true.
The dangers noted above may be addressed to some degree
by instructing the jury to use the evidence for limited purposes
and by restricting the extent and form of the testimony.' When
CSAAS is used to counter impeachment by the defense, the com-
bination of factors described above generally makes its receipt
proper. Even then, appropriate control remains a practical chal-
lenge to trial court judges and an empirical challenge to social
scientists.4" The impact of the evidence must be carefully calibrat-
46. The terminology--Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome or Rape Trau-
ma Syndrome-may cause the jury to conclude that the expert reached a legal conclusion
when the clinical evaluation of the behavior observed is not diagnostic or goes to a dif-
ferent issue. For example, the law of the state may define a defense to rape based on
the defendant's reasonable but mistaken belief in the woman's consent. See, e.g, People v.
Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975) (finding that defendant who holds a reason-
able and bona fide belief that his sexual partner has expressed consent does not possess
the wrongful intent required for the commission of forcible rape). In some instances
under that definition, the woman will sincerely believe she was raped although the law
would define the defendant as not guilty. In that situation, the expert, who has examined
only the woman, might accurately conclude from her perspective that she suffered from
the "rape trauma syndrome." See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 99.
47. The similarity between the conduct of those having the syndrome and a partici-
pant in the trial may occur because the participant is actually suffering from the syn-
drome, because he or she suffers from a related or broader syndrome with similar fea-
tures (such as PTSD), or because of fortuity. In addition, the correspondence may be the
result of a dishonest trial participant cleverly adopting a story that tracks the characteris-
tics of the syndrome in hopes of achieving just this effect. Some believe that Lyle and
Eric Menendez fall into this last category. See O'Neill, supra, note 3, at A22 (recounting
prosecution's argument that defendants' abuse claims were fabricated).
48. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, limits BWS evidence to a general
description of the syndrome and to the characteristics of a person who suffers from it,
and does not allow the expert to specifically connect the defendant to the syndrome. See
e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989).
49. For example, some social science research indicates that only if the evidence is
specifically connected to a trial participant will it be treated seriously by the jury. See
Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 152-53; see also Margaret
Bull Kovera et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of Expert
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ed so that the case is not decided on a newly generated, errone-
ous stereotype. As suggested above, prohibiting use of the term
"syndrome" in this context is an obvious limitation that courts
should impose.
B. Battered Woman Syndrome: A Frequently More Ambitious Use
of Syndrome Evidence that Challenges the Quality of the Social
Science
Battered Woman Syndrome is often offered in homicide cases
where a woman has killed her male companion." The syndrome
evidence may be used for a number of purposes: dispelling myths
that would damage the defendant's credibility as a witness;
51
helping to establish the reasonableness of various elements of the
defendant's conduct, such as her failure to leave the abuser, her
fear that an assault by the abuser was imminent, or her belief that
the impending assault would involve the use of deadly force;" or
proving the ultimate question of whether her act was reason-
able.53
The scientific challenge is greatest if the psychological BWS
has been given a strong diagnostic meaning like that of physical
Battered Child Syndrome, where the expert uses the syndrome to
Evidence Type and Cross-Examination, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 653, 668 (1994) (indicat-
ing that test participants were less influenced by experts testifying about general group
characteristics than by testimony linked to individual case histories). However, the effort
to connect the evidence to a trial participant runs directly counter to efforts to limit ex-
cessive impact. See supra note 48.
Some appropriate limitations, however, can be identified. Because the science re-
veals a societal misunderstanding of basic concepts but does not establish a true syn-
drome with precise dimension, courts should ensure that the evidence presented explicitly
claims only to rebut and disavows an ability to define a positive reality. Thus, upon
request by the opponent of the evidence, jurors should be instructed specifically regarding
the limited validity and utility of CSAAS.
50. Battered Woman Syndrome may also be used in other contexts, For example,
BWS may be used as the basis of a duress defense. See, ag., United States v. Homick,
964 F.2d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting special application of duress defense in conjunc-
tion with BWS).
51. See, eg., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Miscon-
ceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 430 n.183 (1991).
52. See id, at 421 n.146; Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victim-
ization: Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 25 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 277, 282 (1992).
53. See Maguigan, supra note 51, at 430. As to the propriety of using expert testimo-
ny to prove that conduct was "reasonable," see infra text accompanying notes 122, 142-
45.
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establish that the injuries were non-accidental.54 Furthermore,
with more substantial claims for the power of the syndrome and
with more aggressive legal uses of the evidence, dangers more
legal than scientific in nature also increase. These law-related dan-
gers concern the impact of the testimony on non-scientific issues
of moral blameworthiness and social responsibility.
When BWS is used for the purpose of restoring the credibility
of the defendant by countering prosecutorial impeachment, no
specialized evidence showing BWS to be a "syndrome" is required.
BWS performs the same role that the accepted use of CSAAS
performs in child sexual abuse prosecutions. And, as with CSAAS,
the claims of BWS are adequately supported by the more general-
ized reactions of PTSD.5 Thus, the syndrome carries no special
weight and breaks no new ground; the evidence, almost regardless
of form, is readily accepted. 6
Empirical research has established that the experience of
women in abusive relationships produces a set of unique respons-
es,57 and that the public, although not entirely ignorant of that
social reality, has some major misperceptions about it."8 As a way
54. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
55. Indeed, one reformulation of BWS conceptualizes it as a particular subset of
PTSD-a psychological reaction to a particular type of violence. See Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Wom-
an Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1198 (1993); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A.
Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert
Evidence, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 168 (1996); Krista L. Duncan, Comment, "Lies,
Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psychological Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After
Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 765 (1996).
Although satisfactory to support the scientific validity of the evidence for credibility
purposes, this reformulation is not an entirely adequate alternative for other purposes.
Not all women who are believed to be battered meet the diagnostic criteria of PTSD.
See Dutton, supra, at 1198; Duncan, supra, at 765. The solution to incomplete coverage is
not so much a matter of recharacterizing BWS as PTSD as it is recognizing the fact that
battered women fit no single profile, syndrome, or "disorder," whether it is BWS or
PTSD.
56. See supra note 36.
57. See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 59-64 (summa-
rizing the agreement among researchers regarding consistently demonstrated behaviors of
women who have been battered).
58. See, eg., Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Knowledge of Battered Women, 4 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 105, 120-23 (1989) (discussing findings: 1) that jurors generally understood that
women suffer anxiety, depression, and feelings of helplessness, and believe that leaving
their abusive spouses will result in greater harm; 2) that jurors were less likely to be
aware that battered women often blame themselves, feel dependent on their husbands,
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of correcting society's basic misinformation about the reality of
battering relationships, the social science is adequate.
The challenge to the adequacy of this research is also not
great if the evidence is used simply as a basis for the jury to
compare the situation of the defendant and that of other women
to determine whether the defendant's reactions were reasonable, in
the sense that they were normal. Although use of the evidence to
prove reasonableness is different than use of CSAAS solely to
rehabilitate credibility and requires a different legal justification,
the demands of scientific validity are not substantially greater. 9
Frequency of observed behavior among similarly-situated women,
rather than the presence of a true syndrome, should be sufficient
for admissibility.'
When BWS is used in a stronger sense, as a rigorously devel-
oped psychological syndrome through which the expert indepen-
dently establishes that the particular woman's conduct was reason-
able, or, perhaps more appropriately, excusable because of the
impact of a true syndrome on her perceptions and conduct, the
adequacy of the social science is put to a much more strenuous
test.6 When BWS is used in this strong sense, the adequacy of
and predict when violence may occur); Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313-14 (10th Cir.
1992) ("The mystery in this case, as in all battered woman cases, is why Petitioner re-
mained with [her batterer] despite repeated abuse.").
59. Although courts typically do not make this distinction explicit, the analogy to the
rules admitting character evidence of individuals is very effective in explaining why group
character evidence should be admissible when offered by the defense despite the fact that
it is insufficiently powerful to have diagnostic effect. See supra note 33. Also, admission
of BWS when offered by the defense has some constitutional support through the Due
Process Clause. See, eg., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 376 n.11 (N.J. 1984) (noting due
process support for admission of BWS to establish self-defense); Commonwealth v.
Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725, 730-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (noting that the more generous
standard for admissibility of exculpatory evidence as opposed to inculpatory evidence
supports admission of battered person syndrome); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d
308, 313-14 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that denial of funds for BWS expert who could
have helped negate defendant's intent to aid and abet crimes committed by her batterer
violated due process).
60. The fact that social framework evidence could provide a benchmark to help
prove that the conduct in question was normal does not mean that it is necessarily ad-
missible or that the conduct was necessarily legally reasonable. Common or frequent does
not equal legally reasonable because the law incorporates elements of morality into that
legal standard. See infra text accompanying note 144. However, there is a broad political
consensus that the common response of women to domestic violence through self-help
violence may be considered by the jury to be legally reasonable.
61. This formulation raises legal questions as well. The defense that is developed
suggests mental abnormality, which is difficult to establish for most battered women, and
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the science supporting the syndrome raises two types of questions.
First, what are the precise, rather than general, dimensions of that
social reality, that syndrome? Is there a precisely defined syn-
drome that establishes a causal relationship between the pattern of
abuse suffered by the defendant, her psychological reactions, and
her perceptions or subsequent conduct? Second, to what degree
are experts able to diagnose a woman as "suffering from" or fit-
ting within the precisely defined syndrome? The key questions are:
1) whether the scientific evidence supports the existence of a syn-
drome in any sense beyond a frequently observed, but hardly
invariant, correlation between a complex series of behaviors;62
and 2) whether the expert can, in an individual case, independent-
ly certify that a particular woman fits within the syndrome.
Some of the difficulty in establishing the validity of social
science related to this syndrome is a consequence of the virtual
impossibility of conducting a controlled experiment. Using case
studies of observed battering relationships is valuable, but such
studies present problems in research design related to choosing
subjects based on outcomes of the "dependent variable."'63 Case
fits best into the category of excuse defenses rather than the typical justification formula-
tion of battered-women-self-defense cases. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-
Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 11, 23-25, 43 (1986) (discussing rationale for treating battered woman self-
defense as an excuse defense rather than as a justification defense despite the lack of a
mental disability typically required for excuse defenses).
Two rough conceptualizations of the "syndrome" exist. One focuses on the psycho-
logical impact of abuse, suggests viewing the woman's conduct as the consequence of
psychological dysfunction, and supports an excuse defense; the other focuses not only on
the psychological impact of abuse but also on the broader view of the circumstances and
alternatives of battered women, supports viewing the conduct as a reasonable response to
an abnormal situation, and leads to a defense of justification. See Schuller & Hastings,
supra note 55, at 168-71.
62. Determining whether the woman's conduct was reasonable may depend on wheth-
er BWS means that the woman is largely helpless or frequently resists, in the mold of a
survivor. Is the response of battered women relatively uniform, is it dichotomous, or is it
so variant that a single syndrome cannot be identified?
63. Instead of randomly sampling women, the specific characteristics of interest (inde-
pendent variables) are examined for those women already identified as battered or as
having responded in self-defense (the dependent variable of interest). Research limited by
such selection techniques has frequently been found to bias the conclusions that are
reached. Because the members of the group studied all have high or low scores on one
variable, that variable may be assumed to be the cause of the behavior or to be unique-
ly linked to the behavior when in fact others who do not exhibit the behavior at all
have similar scores on the independent variable. See Barbara Geddes, How the Cases
You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, 2 POL.
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studies generally cannot define diagnostic syndromes because the
researcher sees only the features present in the study group, and
cannot determine, even from the frequent presence of that feature,
that it differentiates the observed group from other normal indi-
viduals.' By contrast, when BWS (or CSAAS) is used only to
rehabilitate a woman (or child) who has been shown by indepen-
dent evidence to have been abused, the task facing the social
scientist is much easier, and research on the dependent variable is
quite acceptable.' Here, the evidence is designed simply to en-
rich the jurors' experience by providing them with information
about a new context in which to evaluate unfamiliar conduct.
In a decade-old article,66 Professor David Faigman chal-
lenged Dr. Lenore Walker's strong formulation of BWS67 not
only with respect to methodology but also as to fundamental theo-
ry." Professor Faigman was particularly critical of the "learned
helplessness" concept69 Walker used to establish the reasonable-
ness of remaining in an environment of severe battering.7" In the
main, the criticism of the learned helplessness concept has not
been refuted.7 Indeed, many others, operating from various per-
ANALYSIS 131, 132-33, 136-37, 148-49 (1990); GARY KING El" AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY 129-39 (1994).
64. See Geddes, supra note 63, at 148-49; KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 129-30.
65. See supra text accompanying note 43.
66. David L. Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self.Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986).
67. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
68. See Faigman, supra note 66, at 633-43.
69. According to the theory of "learned helplessness," women often remain in envi-
ronments of severe battering because they are constrained by the battering to do so. See
WALKER, supra note 67, at 86-94.
70. See id. at 640-43. He also challenged Walker's theory of a cycle of violence. See
id at 636-40.
71. See Schopp et al., supra note 57, at 53-59 (continuing to rely heavily upon ar-
guments of Professor Faigman to criticize the methodology and results of Walker's BWS
studies). In addition to the "learned helplessness" concept, Walker's concept of a consis-
tent cycle of violence has been questioned. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged
Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers In Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 789 795-802 (1996) (recounting
criticisms of the basis of the cycle of violence theory); see also David L. Fagman, Map-
ping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 570-72 (1995) (reiterat-
ing criticisms of Walker's research when examined under Daubert analysis); David L.
Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law, 38
EMORY LJ. 1005, 1072-77 (1989) [hereinafter Faigman, To Have and Have Not].
My contention that the criticisms of Dr. Walker's formulation of the BWS have not
been answered is not a claim that none of the weaknesses of the research have been
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spectives, have challenged on both empirical and theoretical
grounds the image of the battered woman as a person rendered
helpless by her experiences.72 One particular criticism of Walker's
paradigm is that, rather than being helpless, many battered women
repeatedly and actively resist the violence against them.73 In dif-
ferent ways, critics have broadly challenged Walker's strong theory
of BWS.
Similarly, exactly what psychologists and other social scientists
can diagnose regarding battering from clinical observations is un-
certain. Most courts have limited the margin of error by requiring
that independent evidence of a history of abuse be introduced as a
precondition for admitting BWS.74 Nevertheless, where this other
evidence is ambiguous, and where there is genuine doubt as to
whether the individual in question is in fact a "battered" per-
son,75 experts are not able to either diagnose battering or its ex-
addressed; nor does it challenge the existence of a consensus among researchers regarding
the rough contours of the special "circumstances and situation" of battered women. See
Schuller & Vidmar, supra note 39, at 281. For example, some studies have made an
effort to compensate for the lack of a control group in Walker's studies. See Duncan,
supra note 55, at 765-67 (describing recent research findings). However, the consensus
view is not that a single clearly defined syndrome exists covering all battered women or
that their conduct is consistently explained by the concepts of "learned helplessness" and
a "cycle of violence." See, e.g., Schuller & Vidmar, supra note 39, at 281. Thus, the
broad claim that the accepted social science research in fact supports the existence of
BWS, see Duncan, supra note 55, at 763-67, rests on an imprecise statement of what
exactly has been validated by the growing body of research.
72. Among the recent critics are two scholars writing about the particular plight of
African-American women who have been battered. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Ma-
donnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman
and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1068-80 (noting that the
learned helplessness paradigm is at odds with the empirical data and the imagery associ-
ated with African-American women and is potentially harmful to their legitimate de-
fense); Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome Selling the Shadow to Support the
Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 317-21, 327-36 (1995) (discussing empirical studies that un-
dercut both the learned helplessness and cycle theories and criticizing the impact of the
syndrome on African-American women who often do not fit the stereotype).
73. See EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988); Karla Fischer et al.,
The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46
S.M.U. L. REV. 2117, 2135-37 (1993) (critiquing the accuracy of the learned helplessness
model in light of the actual experiences of battered women); see also Raeder, supra note
71, at 795-802.
74. See Maguigan, supra note 51, at 429, 464-67 (including table listing cases by
state).
75. Often the existence of significant past abuse is abundantly proven by independent
evidence. However, substantial proof outside the self-serving statements of the defendant
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tent from its psychological markers, or confidently distinguish
BWS from the more general symptoms of PTSD. 6 Accuracy of
diagnoses, however, is important when the syndrome is used, not
merely to support the woman's credibility as a witness or to give a
benchmark of other women's behavior for comparison, but for the
more ambitious purpose of establishing psychological determinants
of the woman's perceptions and conduct.
Despite the failure of social science research to obtain the
required level of certainty and sophistication, a syndrome is typi-
cally admitted either as a result of court ruling, or, more interest-
ingly, as a consequence of a specific statutory authorization man-
dating admissibility of BWS evidence.7 The Ohio statute, for
example, exhibits the broad sweep of such legislation.78 It states
that BWS "currently is a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge"79 and allows expert testimony regarding the syn-
drome to be introduced in support of self-defense "to establish the
requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily
may be more frequently lacking in the particular cases which prosecutors choose to pur-
sue; prosecutors often choose to pursue certain cases precisely because, in their judgment,
the defense to be employed is especially questionable or most likely to be ineffective.
76. See Dutton, supra note 55, at 1222-23; Schuller & Vidmar, supra note 39, at
281-82. The imprecise fit between the definition of the syndrome and the range of reac-
tions of women to repeated battering means that use of the syndrome methodology leads
not only to the possibility of false positives in fitting women erroneously into BWS but
also to the possibility of false negatives in erroneously excluding women from its legal
benefits.
77. See CAL EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d)(2)
(1996); LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 404(A)(2) (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b) (1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23E (Law. Co-op, Supp.
1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.061
(Michie 1996); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 40.7 (West 1992); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.36(b)(2) (West Supp.
1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(b) (Michie Supp. 1996).
78. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06. These statues vary in precise detail.
For example, the chief function of the California statute is to clear the admissibility hur-
dle by establishing that expert testimony regarding the syndrome will not be "considered
a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(b).
The Nevada and Oklahoma statutes make expert testimony concerning the effects of
abuse on beliefs, behavior, and perception admissible. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.061; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.7. The first, brief paragraph of Missouri's stat-
ute flatly declares the syndrome admissible; the second requires the defense to notify the
court if it intends to offer such evidence and allows the defendant to be examined by a
private psychiatrist or psychologist upon motion by the state. See Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 563.033 (West Supp. 1996).
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06(A)(1).
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harm that is necessary... to justify the person's use of the force
in question."8
I suggest an additional reason for broad admissibility, despite
a debatable scientific foundation for the syndrome-politics.81 So-
ciety has arrived at a basic political judgment: the balance of ad-
vantage should be shifted in litigation in favor of battered women
who respond violently to their batterers.' Regardless of how it is
80. Id. § 2901.06(B). The Georgia, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wyoming statutes also
explicitly provide that the expert's testimony is admissible to show the imminence of the
threat, see MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 23E(b); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(b), or the
immediate necessity of the use of deadly force, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d); TEX.
CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.36 (b).
81. I want to note an alternative set of explanations for the broad admissibility of
BWS despite weak scientific support. Professor Taslitz has suggested that a lower level of
certainty may be required of science when used to prove a mental state because, inter
alia, a necessity argument supports less exacting requirements than are required when
proving that an act was done. See Taslitz, supra note 6, at 28. Professors Bonnie and
Slobogin similarly argue for flexibility in the receipt of expert testimony-what they term
the need for informed speculation-regarding the veracity and significance of claims of
aberrational mental functioning regarding past conduct, also in part based on an argu-
ment of necessity. Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV.
427, 452-55, 492-95 (1980).
In my judgment, the necessity argument is far stronger for the insanity defense
than for the use of BWS. Once the legislature authorizes the insanity defense, it makes
little sense to deny the defendant a method of proving that defense, which requires ad-
missibility of psychiatric evidence, even if such evidence lacks scientific certainty.
82. When legislatures make the decision to admit BWS, the operation of a political
judgment is easily assumed. For some of the appellate adoptions of the syndrome, the
political and social judgment is just as clear. For example, in State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364
(N.J. 1984), the court discussed the magnitude of the domestic violence problem as a
backdrop to ruling BWS admissible. See 478 A.2d at 369-72. In later-generation cases,
however, explicit political and social content of the case is largely absent. Instead, the
court simply recounts the substantial acceptance of BWS research by other courts without
noting the existence of any scientific uncertainty about the syndrome or its particular use
in self-defense cases, and the political issues are left to an unreconstructed minority voice.
See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 977-78 (Ohio 1990) (Holmes, J., concurring).
The group of eleven states that have enacted provisions that require courts to
admit expert evidence regarding BWS is a strange mix. Among these eleven are states
that are typically progressive regarding gender issues, such as Massachusetts and Califor-
nia, see supra note 77, but the group is made up principally of conservative and "law
and order" states, such as Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Nevada,
where, for example, executions in capital cases are commonplace. See Mark Potok, Look-
ing Death in the Eye in Texas: Law Lets Families View Executions, USA TODAY, Feb. 1,
1996, at 3A (noting that since 1976, Texas has conducted 104 executions); Tony Mauro,
Pace of Executions Likely to Increase, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1995, at 3A (listing the
number of executions for these states since 1977 as follows: Louisiana 22, Georgia 20,
Missouri 17, Oklahoma 6, and Nevada 5). I suggest that a combination of forces may be
at work-a loose coalition of women's groups and the new brand of law and order sup-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:461
technically labeled, my contention is that the substantive law of
self-defense is being altered by changes in evidentiary rules de-
signed, in large part, to aid women who have engaged in self-
help . 3
The motivation for admitting BWS is quite understandable.
Domestic violence by husbands and boyfriends against women is
an enormous social problem in the United States.' In inter-
spousal killings, well over half of those killed are women.85 Of
women who kill, a large percentage have been previously battered
by the men they kill.86 Society may justifiably believe that the
vast majority of women who die at the hands of their male do-
mestic partners are the ultimate victims of widespread battering
and that these women are largely, if not entirely, guiltless. In
contrast, many of the male homicide victims perpetrated violence
against their female domestic partners in a way that contributed to
their deaths. In a situation where precise proof of actual events
and the survivor's state of mind will be difficult, the judgment is
that women who kill and can show a history of battering should
be aided in their legal defense; when marginal cases are tried, the
woman should generally be given some help in prevailing.'
porters for whom self-help or vigilantism has a positive value in light of their perception
that the justice system has failed to convict and adequately punish the guilty.
83. The clearest changes in the substantive law through an evidentiary rule can be
seen in those states that have enacted statutes that make the syndrome or expert testi-
mony regarding past abuse admissible to show the perception of or belief in the immi-
nence of the physical threat or the necessity of immediate use of deadly force. See supra
note 77; infra note 92. The California statute asserts (futilely, in my judgment) that it
does not intend to change the substantive law. See CAL EVD. CODE § 1107(d),
84. One commentary estimates that between 1.6 and 4 million instances of such
abuse occurred in the United States in a recent year. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne
Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST.
LJ. 363, 366 & n.15 (1992).
85. Figures from the nation's 75 largest counties from 1988 revealed 540 spouse
murder cases, with 59% of the defendants being male. See LANGAN & DAwSON, supra
note 37, at iii. The breakdown in 1982 was very similar-60% female victims and 40%
male victims. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who
Kill Men in Self-Defene, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 121 nn.2 & 3 (1985). More recent
figures show the carnage of domestic violence against women to be even more one-sided;
in 1992, women were victimized by intimates at ten times the rate of men, and 70% of
the victims of homicides by intimates were female. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 3 (1994);
see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 6 (1994).
86. See Maguigan, supra note 51, at 397.
87. Some feminist scholars will view my argument that courts and legislatures have
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In this context, even though the precise elements of BWS are
uncertain and some aspects of the syndrome's scientific foundation
remain weak or unproven, judges and legislators believe BWS to
be better than the existing ignorance of jurors. The social reality
facing battered women is not a matter that can be excluded from
jury consideration. With or without expert testimony, that reali-
ty-or a stereotypical distortion of it-will be part of the jury's
reasoning process." Leaving jurors to their untutored biases in
this situation is not particularly inviting, and even an incomplete
scientific examination of the issue is likely to be superior. The
general perception is that the science is sufficient to support the
intuition of judges, legislators, scholars, and much of the public
that the experience of women who have been battered renders
reasonable much that jurors often find unreasonable.89
reached a political judgment that battered women are to be assisted in winning acquittal
through admission of BWS as badly misstating reality. Professor Elisabeth Ayyildiz argues
that America's favorable image of some vigilantes is limited to males; females are vilified.
See Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough:
The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 141, 155-58 (1995). By
contrast, I am offering the view that the mainstream legal system, including some legisla-
tures, has begun to hold a more favorable view toward battered women who kill, even
those whose conduct may go beyond the traditional dimensions of self-defense. In support
of my position, I note that the conviction rates and sentences imposed in prosecutions of
spousal killings are more favorable to female than to male defendants. See supra note 37.
Which image is accurate? I believe the dispute can never be clearly resolved be-
cause observers too often concentrate on a small set of notorious cases where the system
has clearly failed, such as that of Judy Norman. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8,
14-15 (N.C. 1989) (holding that woman who had been physically and mentally abused by
husband over several years, and who had been diagnosed as suffering from BWS, was
not acting in either perfect or imperfect self-defense when, out of alleged desire to pre-
vent future abuse, she shot her husband while he slept). Broad data on how the criminal
justice system handles most cases is difficult to obtain and evaluate, and individual stories
about how the law handles cases correctly are of no real interest. I believe that, from a
feminist perspective, the law deals better with cases of domestic homicide today than it
did only a decade or so earlier.
I suggest the difference in which cases are being examined explains the very differ-
ent views of the typical battered-woman homicide defendant held by some scholars who
have examined the field. Professor Maguigan, for example, contends that, contrary to a
frequently expressed stereotype among scholars, the vast majority of battered women who
kill do so either during an ongoing attack or when an attack is imminent rather than
during a period of peace and therefore outside the scope of traditionally defined self-
defense. See Maguigan, supra note 51, at 384-85. Professor Maguigan has, I believe, ex-
amined typical cases instead of unusual ones. See id. at 464-78.
88. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF TmE LAW
72-74 (1995) (arguing that, in constructing their view of the events at issue in a case,
jurors by necessity use stereotypes, prototypes, and what they believe is typical, and that
much of what jurors use in this way is predictably inaccurate).
89. Interestingly, the discord between the science and the law may be in the process
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My point-that the substantive law is being changed-is, of
course, technically inaccurate, since the law of self-defense has not
been changed in most jurisdictions." The feature that is new is
the almost automatic admission of contextual information in cases
where the defendant is a woman who has previously been bat-
tered.9 Despite the fact that change is coming through an evi-
of correcting itself as the understanding of the phenomenon of battering becomes more
sophisticated and as less, rather than more, is claimed for the syndrome. The heavily
theory-driven BWS of Dr. Walker-suggesting psychological abnormality, providing power-
ful explanation for conduct, and requiring the ability to define and diagnose a uniform
pattern of behavior-is being replaced by a more general set of concepts that emphasize
the significance of battered women's experiences, including not only psychological reac-
tions, but also the circumstances and alternatives-the broad social reality-facing women.
This latter reformulation includes focus on the lack of effective community alternatives as
well as economic constraints. See Dutton, supra note 55, at 1201-03, 1233 (suggesting that
expert witnesses on BWS should follow an assessment and evaluation process individual-
ized to the particular victim, that general testimony on BWS requires balancing society's
interests with the victim's wishes, and that economic issues may impact a woman's deci-
sion to press charges); Schuller & Hastings, supra note 55, at 171 (referring to various
theories positing that a woman's circumstances and alternatives are integral to the testi-
mony about BWS).
The lesser claims of this testimony make it easier to sustain from a scientific per-
spective. In particular, inability to diagnose a particular syndrome is largely eliminated as
a significant difficulty. See Schuller & Vidmar, supra note 39, at 281-82 (discussing the
accuracy of diagnosing BWS). However, the reformulation may exacerbate another prob-
lem-the difficulty of preventing group character or framework testimony from being
used on behalf of others who have engaged in self-help violence. If the demands on the
science are rather minimal, and if the evidence is admitted under an analogy to character
evidence, see supra note 33, then limitations on use of this evidentiary doctrine by defen-
dants in other situations may be easier to surmount. As discussed below, I believe this
danger can be dealt with in the main by application of the remaining evidentiary require-
ments, see infra Section ILB., and by a more explicit recognition of the important role
that politics has played in the decision to permit the admission of evidence regarding
battered women. See infra Section II.C.
90. Depending on the rigidity with which a syndrome is defined, the change thus
does not automatically entail the negative consequence, recognized by scholars, that the
creation of a separate standard of reasonableness for battered women would likely lead
to denial of a defense to women who differ from the stereotype. See Maguigan, supra
note 51, at 443-45. Even more flexibility is available if the more general "group charac-
ter" concept is employed. See supra note 87.
91. A focus on such contextual information is a hallmark of a feminist approach to
law. See Aviva Orenstein, That Same Old Voice Is Yelling Again: A Feminist Critique of
the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript at 25-30, on file with author).
The use of an evidentiary concept that broadly admits contextual information may
offer a greater ability to adapt to differing factual situations, but it may generate limi-
tations similar to those associated with a separate standard of reasonableness for battered
women. See supra note 90. To the degree that BWS is limited to an erroneously defined
or stereotypical battered woman, such as a helpless victim, it may improperly omit those
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dentiary rule rather than a modification of self-defense law, my
point remains: courts and legislatures are altering the substantive
law by admitting a new class of evidence that will produce predict-
ably different outcomes.' Although in part a resolution of a fac-
tual issue, this determination is also based on a moral judgment
about who should be punished in the context of domestic violence.
A sophisticated view of criminal law recognizes that it regu-
lates both the determination of historical fact and the evaluation
of moral guilt.93 Changes in evidence law that alter the determi-
nation of historical fact can have the same effect as changes in the
substantive law, both by giving the jury additional information and
by providing a richer context for the jury's exercise of moral judg-
ment. Professor Faigman has argued that the social framework
regarding BWS, although often proffered in the guise of scientific
fact, reflects in reality a "thinly disguised normative judgment"
who do not fit the type, such as those who have repeatedly offered active resistance. See,
e.g., Ayyildiz, supra note 87, at 146.
92. The virtual equivalence between the admission of BWS and a change in the
substantive law is most clear in the five states that have enacted statutes that declare the
evidence admissible to show the imminence of the threat or the need for immediate use
of deadly force. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d) (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233,
§ 23E(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06(B) (Banks-
Baldwin 1994); TEx. CODE CRAM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.36 (b) (West Supp. 1995); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(b) (Michie Supp. 1996). Presumably, the admissibility of BWS on
these issues means that even if the killing occurred in a non-confrontational situation,
such as when the decedent was sleeping, the defendant will be entitled to a self-defense
instruction.
Admission of BWS is not always tantamount to a change in the substantive law.
One of the most well-known and often criticized cases involving battered women who kill
is that of Judy Norman, which was a case of incredible inhumane treatment and judicial
intransigence. See e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL L. REv. 1, 66
n.333 (1994) (using Norman's story as archetype); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 89-93 (1991)
(criticizing the Norman decision and suggesting "separation assault" theory as an alterna-
tive view to what the court in Norman found to be homicidal self-help for battered
wives); Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371, 372-76 (1993) (criticizing the Norman decision and advo-
cating a change in the imminence requirement for self-defense cases). In terms of legal
doctrine, the Norman case is known for its holding that, because under North Carolina
law the threat of harm must be imminent, a battered spouse who kills her sleeping hus-
band is not entitled to claim self-defense. See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 12-13. The North
Carolina Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that position in State v. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1,
1 (N.C. 1996) ("The arguments the defendant advances . . . were answered in Norman.
We see no reason to change our position.").
93. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Function of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197-98 (1983).
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whereby the "established policy of legal rules becomes modified,
and in some cases nullified.,
94
To the extent that the social science research does not ade-
quately support the use of BWS in all its uses, I believe the effec-
tive result is as Professor Faigman argues: that such results should
be recognized in the interest of accuracy, and that a normative
judgment was, at some basic level, likely understood and intended
by many lawmakers. 95 The broad political consensus is both that
social reality of the battering relationship is badly imbalanced and
that the legal process has not appropriately responded to self-help
violence by women.96 As a result, and despite scientific uncertain-
94. Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 71, at 1075.
95. See id. at 1072-74.
96. Judicial treatment of BWS in the context of a duress defense supports the gener-
al political nature of decisions to admit or exclude such evidence and, to a lesser extent,
demonstrates an interplay between the admissibility and the form of evidence. Although
not uniformly excluded, BWS is less accepted within the duress defense than when used
in a self-defense context. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir.
1994) (ruling BWS is irrelevant to the exclusively objective test of duress); State v. Riker,
869 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1994) (holding that expert testimony regarding BWS was inadmis-
sible due to lack of scientific support regarding an intimate, non-battering relationship
which did not meet the more rigorous requirements of the disfavored duress defense); see
also Christine Emerson, Note, United States v. Willis: No Room for the Battered Woman
Syndrome in the Fifth Circuit?, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 317, 330-40 (1996) (criticizing the
Willis decision); Ann-Marie Montgomery, Note, State v. Riker, Battered Women Under
Duress: The Concept the Washington Supreme Court Could Not Grasp, 19 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 385, 405-20 (1996) (criticizing the Riker opinion).
The Riker court was particularly direct about its concerns. It argued that recogniz-
ing BWS within the duress defense would mean that "the evidentiary doors will be
thrown open to every conceivable emotional trauma," Riker, 869 P.2d at 51 n.5, and
noted that duress differs from self-defense in that the latter involves acts against the
person abusing the defendant while the former frees the defendant from liability for
harm to "an innocent third party." ld. at 51. Although placed in the context of the legal
definition of duress, I believe this reticence to extend BWS to duress defenses reflects
the absence of societal consensus that battered women should be supported when their
conduct affects others beside the abuser or involves ordinary crime, such as drug distri-
bution. As discussed infra Section II.A., I believe that "abuse excuse" defenses are most
effective with juries when the victim is the abuser-not as a general excuse for criminali-
ty-and that this same political reaction operates when appellate judges shape the law.
Cf. Montgomery, supra at 405-06 (criticizing the Riker court's analysis of evidentiary
issues and attributing errors to a focus on policy and "acceptable" results). Furthermore,
courts that accept the use of BWS within a duress defense attempt to draw a distinction
between the plight of battered women and other psychological syndromes. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 1992) (declaring "that the unique nature
of battered woman syndrome justifies a somewhat different approach to the way we have
historically applied [the principles of the duress defense]").
Although use of BWS or similar evidence under the duress defense will likely
continue to meet resistance because of a lack of political consensus that women should
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ty about the existence of a true syndrome, the judgment is that ju-
rors should nevertheless receive such evidence to help redress the
imbalance."
C. General Exclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding the Weak-
nesses of Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A Focus on the
Fit of the Evidence, Not the Validity of the Science
Expert testimony regarding the weaknesses of eyewitness
identification testimony, while not syndrome evidence itself, shares
an essential feature with much syndrome evidence in that an ex-
pert offers information about how groups of people perceive and
react as a basis for evaluating the claims of an eyewitness in a
particular case. Although expert testimony regarding BWS is usu-
ally admitted, expert testimony regarding the weaknesses of eye-
witness testimony is consistently rejected.98 While ignoring the
be excused for acts against uninvolved third parties, recognizing more explicitly that ad-
mission of BWS-type evidence is a response to a unique social malady may make its use
more palatable. See Emerson, supra at 338-39 (arguing that the feared extension of the
defense to youth gang violence is already precluded by the requirement that the defen-
dant has not recklessly placed himself in a situation likely to produce duress, a situation
that society should acknowledge is different than the abusive relationship in which many
women innocently find themselves). Finally, viewing the effects of battering on women as
a "syndrome" that suggests psychological abnormality may inhibit admission of evidence
of the effects of battering to support a duress defense, which is predominantly objective
in character and imposes the requirement that the defendant resist the coercion as would
a person of reasonable firmness. See i at 334-36, 339.
97. Fortunately, some research indicates that the precise form of the corrective edu-
cation may be unimportant. Proof in the form of a syndrome or in the form of group
character evidence appears to have approximately the same impact on the jury's analysis
of the evidence and upon trial outcomes. See Schuller & Hastings, supra note 55, at 183
(detailing results of Canadian study involving parallel self-defense laws).
98. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New
Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1995) (finding that most
courts are reluctant to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification). Probably the
best known of the appellate opinions that provided an opportunity for admission of eye-
witness identification experts under specified circumstances is People v. McDonald, 690
P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984) (allowing the testimony of eyewitness identification experts
when the eyewitness identification of the defendant is not substantially corroborated and
the defendant offers expert testimony on specific psychological factors that go to the
accuracy of the identification but are unlikely to be understood by the jury). The nega-
tive attitude of courts toward admissibility is displayed in many ways, such as a recent
decision holding that the conditions for admissibility under McDonald were not met. See
People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 434-36 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 115 (1996).
See also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-85 (8th Cir. 1996) (giving a laundry list
of reasons for excluding such testimony). As may be expected, an occasional court bucks
the trend and admits such expert testimony. See, eg., United States v. Jordan, 924 F.
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weakness of expert testimony with respect to the former, courts
find little significance in the strength of the social science research
with respect to the latter. In excluding experts on eyewitness iden-
tifications, courts employ a number of rationales,99 but recently
they have tended to emphasize the "fit" of the evidence to the
case.
100
Courts approach the issue of "fit" in two ways. First, follow-
ing United States v. Downing,'0 ' courts have required a showing
by the defense that the content of the expert's testimony is suffi-
ciently tied to the facts of the particular case." The result of
such analysis is to leave the admissibility of the evidence within
the discretion of the trial judge, who almost always decides to ex-
clude it."° On a few occasions, appellate courts have found that
the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony on eyewitness
identification when the evidence was closely connected with the
facts of the case involving an important and likely misunderstood
issue.' 4
Supp. 443, 448-49 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (admitting expert testimony on memory, perception,
and eyewitness testimony).
99. See Handberg, supra note 98, at 1033-41 (cataloging the different bases for rejec-
tion of such evidence).
100. This is a requirement of relevancy which has specific application to scientific evi-
dence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579,
591-92 (1993).
101. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
102. See id. at 1242.
103. United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993), is typical. The Harris court
affirmed the exclusion of the eyewitness identification expert, citing the general and the
specific impact of Downing.
Until fairly recently, most, if not all, courts excluded expert psychological
testimony on the validity of eyewitness identification .... But, there has been a
trend in recent years to allow such testimony under circumstances described as
"narrow." See United States v. Downing.
These narrow circumstances such as described in United States v. Down-
ing. . . were not present in the case sub judice.
Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
104. For example, in United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991),
the court reversed the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony and ruled that it
should have been permitted on the single issue of the lack of correlation between the
confidence of a witness in his or her identification and the accuracy of that identification.
Two witnesses in the case had expressed high confidence in their identification, and the
appellate court recognized that the expert testimony would have rebutted "the natural as-
sumption that such a strong expression of confidence indicates an unusually reliable iden.
tification." Id. at 1400.
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The second application of "fit" is much more questionable in
terms of evidentiary and scientific analysis. Some courts exclude
the testimony because the expert has not examined or cannot give
an opinion about the weakness of the particular identification. 5
This objection is rather extraordinary when examined in light of
the social science. Although it is correct that experts cannot make
the particular connection being demanded, this inability does not
differentiate expert testimony on eyewitnesses from most syn-
dromes. Except for the rare syndrome that is diagnostic, experts
cannot establish the presence of a syndrome independently of the
participant's generally self-serving claims.
1 6
Other courts expand this element of "fit" into what I believe
is the true concern animating the general exclusion of expert tes-
timony regarding eyewitness identification: that such testimony
applies to too many cases and may broadly undermine jury accep-
tance of identification evidence.' ° Such courts argue that an
expert's opinion concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimo-
ny is based on statistical averages and that the eyewitness in a
particular case may well not fit within the spectrum of these aver-
ages. In the judgment of these courts, it would be inappropriate
for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eye-
witness testimony is unreliable.'
105. See, eg., Ex parte Williams, 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992) (concluding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony where that ruling
appeared to be based upon the expert's unfamiliarity with the facts of the case and lack
of personal contact with the victim); Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1990) (ap-
proving exclusion of testimony because "[t]he psychiatrist admitted he could not testify
regarding the reliability of any specific witness, but could only offer general comments
about how a witness arrives at his conclusions"); State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 713-14
(R.I. 1994) (affirming trial court reliance, inter alia, on fact that expert had "no idea
about this particular witness in this particular case, her level of stress").
106. Ironically, any claim by the expert to make the connection between the science
and the witness is likely to add to the potential prejudice from such testimony by in-
creasing the danger that the expert's testimony will be overvalued. See supra notes 48-49
and accompanying text.
107. See People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1165 (Ill. 1990).
108. See id. at 1165. The court was also concerned with the general problem of the
overuse of expert testimony:
We caution against the overuse of expert testimony. Such testimony, in this case
concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, could well lead to the use
of expert testimony concerning the unreliability of other types of testimony and,
eventually, to the use of experts to testify as to the unreliability of expert testi-
mony. So-called experts can usually be obtained to support most any position.
The determination of a lawsuit should not depend upon which side can present
the most or the most convincing expert witnesses. We are concerned with the
reliability of eyewitness expert testimony . . . .whether and to what degree it
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When the very different treatments of expert testimony re-
garding BWS and expert testimony regarding eyewitness identi-
fication are compared, courts' striking indifference to variances in
the quality of the research between the two areas is apparent. The
research with regard to the former, as described above, 9 has
been vigorously criticized, while the research regarding eyewitness
identification, which is classic in its methodology, rests on very
solid ground."0 However, when one examines the quality of the
evidence in combination with its use, the focus on the "fit" of the
evidence rather than its scientific validity is more sensible. For
eyewitness identification experts, the quality of the science need
not be exact, much like the research regarding CSAAS, because
eyewitness expert evidence is being used only to explain reactions
to known conditions, not to diagnose a pattern of behavior indi-
cating that an event occurred. The science should be judged ade-
quate for its purpose, but that judgment is not decisive; the ade-
quacy of the science is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.
The ultimate issue is the helpfulness of the evidence for what is a
relatively limited purpose. When courts concentrate on the "fit" of
the evidence, they are speaking to that relative degree of helpful-
ness and may be assuming that the science is adequate for that
purpose.
Although the "fit" of the evidence to the case provides part
of the explanation for the consistent exclusion of expert testimony
on eyewitness identification, I believe that the more important
factor is the perceived impact of the testimony on outcomes."'
can aid the jury, and if it is necessary in light of defendant's ability to cross-
examine eyewitnesses.
Id. (citations omitted).
109. See supra note 71-73 and accompanying text.
110. See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Re-
liability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV. So.
& L. 229, 256 (1995) (arguing that quality of science is such that eyewitness expert testi-
mony meets Daubert requirements). In contrast, the courts have shown remarkable persis-
tence in excluding such testimony, even by relying on the argument of scientific inade-
quacy. For example, in United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth
Circuit excluded expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification evidence under
Daubert, despite an apparent showing of general acceptance, because the defendant failed
to establish scientific validity under the new standard. See Rincon, 28 F.3d at 924-25.
111. As expressed in cases like United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 169 (5th Cir.
1987), courts also focus on the "overburdening" of the courts if such evidence were rou-
tinely admitted, which sounds like an objection regarding "waste of time." See FED. R.
EviD. 403. This concern is different than the outcome-determinative focus that I am sug-
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Group character evidence exists largely separate from the facts of
the case, and so it may be used, and therefore might affect the
outcome, in large classes of cases regardless of their particular
facts. Furthermore, such evidence typically favors one side in the
case, consistently aiding either the defense or the prosecution. In
these circumstances, feelings about the correctness of the relative
rate of convictions or about specific societal ills, such as the need
to be more effective in protecting children from sexual abuse and
women from domestic violence, play an important role in the
general admissibility decision. The social judgment has been
reached that, in light of unfavorable odds in the home, prospects
at trial should be improved for battered women, who are typically
true victims. In contrast, and despite lip service to the inherent
weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence, courts do not
believe that innocent defendants are frequently convicted as a
result of such evidence."2 The greater perceived danger is that
such expert testimony would too often produce acquittals of the
guilty; this fear has led to its general exclusion. Judicial concern
with impact on outcomes, although more traditional in form and
less explicitly political than many decisions regarding BWS, is
another manifestation of the operation of politics.
gesting, and certainly for some courts it is a sufficient independent reason. Nevertheless,
the "overburdening," or "waste of time" rationale, absent concern about the impact on
the outcome, would not produce the consistent pattern of exclusion observed. Important
evidence is generally admitted despite concerns about consumption of time, and in many
cases, expert evidence regarding eyewitness identification would prove important. Al-
though it is generally not articulated, I suspect that the principal justification for exclu-
sion is a fear by many courts that such expert testimony would prove effective in dis-
crediting eyewitness testimony regardless of the merits. Cf. People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d
1155, 1165 (I11. 1990) (upholding exclusion of expert testimony concerning the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony and suggesting that the trial judge should balance the probative
effect of such expert testimony against its prejudicial effect).
112. A typical statement regarding the dangers of eyewitness testimony is found in
United States v. Wade: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." 388 U.S. 218,
228 (1967) (footnote omitted). However, the Supreme Court's later statement in Manson
v. Brathwaite, that "[w]e are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of
American juries," 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977), more accurately captures the general feeling of
courts that such evidence is not a real threat to an acceptable jury verdict. A number of
defendants have been proven innocent since DNA testing became available in the late
1980s, see Paula Span, The Gene Team: Innocence Project Fights Misjustice with DNA
Testing, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1994, at C1, occurrences which lend credence to the argu-
ment that truly innocent people are sometimes convicted. An archetypal erroneous verdict
is that based on eyewitness identification where the victim is completely confident of her
identification. See id.
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II. DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR GROUP CHARACTER
AND SYNDROME EVIDENCE IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Role of Syndrome Evidence in the Growth of "Abuse
Excuses"
Is there a crisis in contemporary criminal cases where syn-
drome evidence is used in defenses that are based on the fact that
the defendant has been abused? Certain highly visible cases create
the impression that there is, and several commentators suggest
these cases reflect a dereliction of personal moral responsibility in
the criminal law and in American society."' The problems with
which syndrome evidence is associated, however, have been part
of our jury trial system at least since stories of successful trial
lawyers have been recorded; with or without syndrome evidence,
certain types of self-defense cases have always proved challenging
to the prosecution. Although syndromes aid the defense in some
of these cases, the use of such evidence does not constitute a
watershed development in the defense arsenal.
The cover of the June, 1994 American Bar Association Jour-
nal asked: "Has a Talk-Show Mentality Softened Jurors to Accept
Any Excuse?""' 4 To be sure, television talk shows bombard the
public with tales of woe and abuse. However, the claim of the
Journal cover is almost entirely fanciful. If there is a connection
between talk shows and excusing the abused, the connection is
precisely the opposite of that suggested-the public has heard so
many claims of abuse that, if anything, it has become jaded."5
The real problem is not a tendency to accept a generalized
claim of abuse as an excuse or defense for criminal conduct. Rath-
er, it exists when the person believed by the prosecution to be the
113. Although they approach the problems with criminal trials in America with very
different perspectives, Professors Alan Dershowitz and George Fletcher appear in basic
agreement on this point. See DERSHOwrrz, supra note 1, at 6, 19, 41; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 16-18, 255
(1995).
114. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, A.B.A. J., June 1994.
115. Indeed, the ABA Journal cover story found that such defenses were not particu-
larly successful. See id. at 40, 42; see also Arenella, supra note 1, at 703-05, 09 (arguing
that successful "abuse excuses" are extraordinarily rare and that rather than broadly
excusing conduct because of past abuse, our criminal law imposes moral accountability on
all but the most severely disabled); Bonnie, supra note 1, at 15 (perceiving not a prolif-
eration of excuses or a softening of public attitudes toward punishment, but rather a
hardening of public attitudes and a general abandonment of individualizing features in
punishment).
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victim is presented by the defense as having acted violently toward
the defendant or as having been generally "unworthy." Although
American juries are not particularly impressed by an "abuse ex-
cuse" when the defendant claims that past societal wrongs justify
criminal action against an uninvolved victim, I believe that juries
resonate with defenses that paint that alleged victim either as gen-
erally unworthy or as deserving to die for particular wrongs done
to the defendant.
Painting the alleged victim as one who deserved his fate is
hardly new. Three decades ago, long before BWS was recognized,
the colorful defense attorney Percy Foreman described his success
in one case where, after he had sketched an impression of the
"victim's" misdeeds, "the jury was ready to dig up the deceased
and shoot him all over again.""' 6 Almost accidentally, that feel-
ing may comport with justice. Its predominant effect, however, is
likely to be an acquittal, not because of what the victim did to the
defendant during the legally relevant period, but because of who
the victim was or, more problematically, who the defense por-
trayed him to have been.
Even without syndrome evidence, proof of some past acts of
violence by the decedent, either acts against the defendant or acts
the defendant knows of, is uniformly admissible in spousal kill-
ings."7 Furthermore, the "subjectifying" of self-defense law"'
and the expansion of the "imperfect self-defense" defense" 9 pro-
vide excellent theoretical vehicles with which the defendant may
introduce an expanded range of the decedent's vile acts. Such
opportunities are available independent of developments in syn-
drome evidence.'"
116. Marshall Smith, Attorney Percy Foreman Wins Another Big Case: His Lifetime
Record-Won: 700, Lost 1, LIFE, Apr. 1, 1966, at 92, 96.
117. See Maguigan, supra note 51, at 421 n.145.
118. Self-defense standards for determining what is reasonable have become more sub-
jective, taking into account more of the individual characteristics of the defendant, includ-
ing her knowledge and the social context of the crime. See Murphy, supra note 52, at
279, 310.
119. Where perfect self-defense cannot be established, imperfect self-defense, which re-
duces the severity of the crime, may be proven in many jurisdictions. See WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.11(a) (2d ed. 1986). Imperfect
self-defense occurs when the defendant committed homicide based on an actual but un-
reasonable belief that deadly force was required. See id.
120. As Professor Bonnie has observed, "[t]he contemporary trend ...is to make the
legal standard for excuse or mitigation more subjective and open-textured, thereby
opening the door to more psychological evidence." Bonnie, supra note 1, at 8.
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Syndrome evidence does, however, provide a number of ad-
vantages to a defendant set on vilifying the decedent. First, syn-
drome evidence lends credibility to the defendant's factual asser-
tions, which may otherwise be of doubtful validity but nevertheless
immune to direct refutation because the defendant killed the only
other knowledgeable person. The jury is likely to give the
defendant's story of abuse more credit than it otherwise would
receive because many others have told the same or a similar sto-
ry. 2 1 Second, expert testimony regarding a syndrome may, in
some instances, include testimony by the expert of the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct. If this type of testimony is per-
mitted, then the defendant benefits from the weight of an expert's
"not guilty" judgment." Third, syndrome evidence will usually
permit an expansion of the scope of the victim's conduct that is
admitted, both in terms of the period of time covered and the
types of conduct included."z
These advantages are generally available in cases where BWS
evidence is introduced, and I would be distressed if these
problematic aspects of BWS evidence were extended indiscrimi-
nately to other areas, 24 permitting a victim's history of violence
or other misdeeds to be used to justify a defendant's homicidal
act. The case of Daimian Osby threatened to produce such an
expansion. In April, 1994, Osby was tried in Fort Worth, Texas
for the murder of two men; he contended the killings were justi-
fied under the self-defense principle, as supplemented by, in his
121. The similarity may not be accidental but may rather be the result of a killer
crafting a script that tracks the key features of a syndrome. See supra note 47.
122. Testimony that the defendant's conduct was reasonable should not be allowed.
Such testimony represents a classic violation of the rule stating that use of unelucidated
legal terminology by an expert is forbidden. See FED R. EVm. 704 advisory committee's
note. Also, the decision of a jury that the conduct of the defendant was reasonable in-
corporates both factual and moral elements. The expert is incapable of rendering an
opinion regarding the legal reasonableness of the conduct. Such testimony should remain
inadmissible regardless of whether syndrome testimony is received for other purposes. See
infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
123. See James R. Acker & Hans Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Tes-
timony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 CR2M. L. BULL. 125, 146 (1985).
124. Others have recognized the threat of the concepts developed regarding BWS ex-
panding into other areas. See, eg., Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right:
The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self.Defense, 62 IND.
LJ. 1253, 1276 (1987) ("Soon . . . other victim[s] of repeated assaults or other crimes,
may be able to claim self-defense based upon a victimization-syndrome."); Rosen, supra
note 61, at 16-17, 32; see also infra note 141.
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attorney's words, an "Urban Survival Syndrome."'- Osby testi-
fied in the initial trial, which ended with a deadlocked jury, that
he killed his 28-year-old and 19-year-old cousins after a year-long
dispute over $400 he had won from them in a dice game.'2
Osby, an African-American, contended that he shot the two un-
armed men, also African-Americans, because they had threatened
him a week earlier with a shotgun and he feared for his life."
Osby added to these claims the testimony of an expert who
described general statistics regarding violence involving young
African-American men."2 The expert testified that members of
this demographic group were statistically more likely to commit
violent acts or to be victims of such acts than members of other
groups. Osby's lawyer attempted to manipulate these facts into a
syndrome with the argument that the perceived level of terror is
greatly increased when a young African-American male is set
upon by other young African-American men.'29
Another case illustrates the danger of expanding the self-de-
fense doctrine developed in BWS cases to situations that may
125. See Floyd, supra note 2, at 21A. The action of defense counsel to attach a
catchy name suggesting an element of scientific certainty is without justification, and,
whether likely to have a significant impact on the jury or not, such labeling should be
prohibited unless supported. The act of attaching a "syndrome" label to evidence is
something that not only lawyers, but also experts, are growing more adept at doing, and
in both situations, attaching a catchy title to a defense contributes to the erroneous per-
ception that abuse defenses are widespread. See Bonnie, supra note 1, at 1-6 (describing
how the use of the term "syndrome" leads to a perception of an explosion of such cases
because that term appears in newspaper reports, which are in the modem age instantly
electronically searchable on a national basis).
126. For a more detailed account of the facts of the case, see Wally Owens, Note,
State v. Osby, The Urban Survival Syndrome, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 809, 809-11 (1995).
127. See id.
128. See Montgomery, supra note 2, at 1A. The expert was Jared Taylor, author of a
recent book, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992).
129. See Floyd, supra note 2, at 21A. On retrial, Osby attempted to introduce the
testimony not only of the expert on race relations, but also that of a psychologist. Both,
however, were excluded by the trial judge. Osby was thereafter convicted. See Lori Mont-
gomery, Teen Guilty of Murder; Urban Theory Not Allowed, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov.
12, 1994, at 6A.
The conviction on retrial may be explained by new evidence rather than exclusion
of Osby's experts. At the second trial, the prosecution also produced two new eyewitness-
es to the events. They testified that before the shooting they had broken up a fight
between Osby and his two cousins and were restraining the cousins when Osby put a
gun to one cousin's head and pulled the trigger. See Steven R. Reed, Teen Gets Life
Sentence in "Urban Survival" Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 1994, at 33.
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present a more fundamental challenge to the law. In Durham,
North Carolina, Michael Seagroves, a white male, claimed that he
was lawfully defending his home when, in March 1993, he fatally
shot an unarmed 15-year-old African-American boy four times and
wounded the decedent's 17-year-old companion. The two had
broken into Seagroves' garage to steal his motorcycle while he was
at home caring for his ill infant son. 30
At trial, Seagroves called a psychiatrist who had examined
him and found him to have suffered from an acute stress disorder
during the break-in that subsequently matured into Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD).'3 That evidence aided Seagroves' de-
fense on two fronts--credibility and criminal responsibility.13
Seagroves' testimony regarding the defense of his home was im-
peached by prior damaging statements to the police and by his in-
ability to explain his conduct fully: according to the police, Sea-
groves stated shortly after the fatal shooting that he fired several
shots at the intruders as they ran away, even stepping outside the
broken garage door and firing two more shots."' When he testi-
fied at trial, he stated that he had fired only when the teens ran
toward him in the garage and denied firing as they ran away.3
4
Seagroves' trial version supported his acquittal; his prior statement
did not.35
Regarding credibility, the psychiatrist testified that during the
intrusion Seagroves was under acute stress and later suffered from
PTSD;136 that PTSD can affect the ability to remember; and that
Seagroves suffered memory lapses when he was most fearful-
when he felt he was under attack and fired the shots.137 The ex-
130. See Jaleh Hagigh, Closing Arguments Draw Tears in Court; Seagroves Jurors to
Deliberate Monday, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 11, 1993, at Al.
131. See John Stevenson, Expert Seagroves' Reaction Typical; Shooting of Teen Bur-
glars Could Rest with Jury Today, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 9, 1993, at Al.
132. See Jaleh Hagigh, Psychiatrist Supports Seagroves, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Dec. 9, 1993, at Al.
133. See Officer: Suspect Said Youths Running When He Fired, CHARLOmrE OBSERV-
ER, Dec. 3, 1993, at 4C.
134. See Homeowner Blames Fear for Shots; Amount of Force at Issue in Trial of
Durham Man, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 8, 1993, at 1C.
135. The jury deadlocked eight to four for acquittal on the charge of manslaughter,
and the state subsequently dismissed charges. See Danny Lineberry, Seagroves Will Not
Face Retria" State Says It Could Not Win Guilty Verdict in Shooting, HERALD-SUN (Dur-
ham, N.C.), Jan. 26, 1994, at Al.
136. See Stevenson, supra note 131, at Al.
137. See Hagigh, supra note 130, at Al. The psychiatrist testified that Seagroves' re-
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pert also testified that when Seagroves fired at the intruders, he
acted in "an understandable way,""' 8 did "what a 'normal' per-
son would have done in the same circumstances,"'3 9 and was "on
automatic pilot,... firing reflexively out of terror."" This part
of the expert's testimony, which went beyond credibility to crimi-
nal responsibility, is potentially of much greater significance.
Taken together, the Osby and Seagroves cases illustrate the
potential danger of extending the doctrines developed from bat-
tered woman self-defense cases into other areas.'41 The defen-
dant may attempt to use expert testimony to paint the decedent as
part of a feared group, as Osby did by introducing statistics re-
garding violence by young African-American males. The defendant
may also attempt to introduce testimony that labels his own con-
duct as understandable, or even explicitly reasonable. In my judg-
ment, the type of threat posed by the Osby case can be controlled
relatively easily. The challenge of the Seagroves case to evidence
law is subject to a limited control, but cannot be fully answered
without resorting to measures that would sweep too broadly.
True "trash" syndromes should not threaten justice; they can
and should be excluded as scientifically invalid. The Urban Surviv-
sponses were "absolutely characteristic" of PTSD. Estes Thompson, Psychiatrist Says
Homeowner's Reaction to Break-In Consistent, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 1993, at
1C.
138. See id.
139. See Hagigh, supra note 130, at Al.
140. See Stevenson, supra note 131, at Al.
141. The threat of expansion of the principles behind BWS is sometimes illustrated by
such outrageous examples as to create the impression that BWS has fundamentally under-
mined criminal responsibility. In its brief to the court in State v. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1
(N.C. 1996), the prosecution used a very colorful form of this argument.
The State argues that it would be impossible to confine such a standard to use
in battered spouse cases and would lead to an application for other "identifiable
psychological syndrome." For example, should Timothy McVeigh (the Oklahoma
City bombing suspect) be allowed to have a "reasonable militant militia-person"
standard applied to his actions[?] What if it could be shown (and it can) that
such persons suffer from a syndrome identified by an extreme distrust of gov-
ernment, a heightened since [sic] of patriotism, "loner" traits, NRA membership,
"barrel-sucking" (i.e an unnatural fascination with guns), and excessive doses of
ultra-conservative AM talk radio hosts? Would such a person not be entitled to
an instruction on perfect self-defense if he took murderous action against "Pres-
ident Clinton's jack booted thugs" out of a belief in the imminence of bodily
harm against him for his views? Are we to have a "reasonable former ath-
lete/movie star" standard? How far could this go? The state agues that any
modification is too far.
Brief for State at 24, State v. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1996) (No. 67A95). See also
Under the Dome: Battered Militia Syndrome?, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May
18, 1996, at A3 (quoting prosecution's argument).
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al Syndrome should be excluded on the basis of well-established
principles of evidence law. Admission of such evidence requires a
showing that some real science exists to support the expert testi-
mony;42 no reliable theory or methodology supports Urban Sur-
vival Syndrome. An essential element of the justification for ad-
mitting group character evidence is that it must correct jury misin-
formation and eliminate biases; Urban Survival Syndrome evidence
fails that basic requirement as well. In the Osby case, the defense
entirely failed to prove that it was correcting an erroneous stereo-
type. Instead, use of the Urban Survival Syndrome likely exacer-
bated a set of powerful, negative stereotypes held by the commu-
nity regarding young African-American males and violence. 43
In a case like that of Seagroves, where syndrome evidence is
used to establish affirmatively, albeit indirectly, the reasonableness
of conduct, the expert should be required to: 1) demonstrate a
present ability to diagnose the existence of a condition that would
support an opinion regarding reasonableness; or 2) acknowledge
that his testimony is merely an interpretation of the defendant's
claims. In the Seagroves case itself, the expert did not and could
not show that he was able to establish independently that the
defendant's reactions at the time of the shooting were "normal"
and "reflexive," rather than those of a homeowner who was trau-
matized by a break-in and/or its fatal aftermath but who over-
reacted when he fired the fatal shots. Particularly when the use of
142. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993)
(holding that the overarching subject of the inquiry envisioned by Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 is "the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission").
143. I believe that the claims regarding the dangers of expansion to other areas are
vastly overstated and that typically the extreme examples, like the Osby case, pose no
real threat. In addition to the bases for rejection of these defenses developed below,
factual limitations are very important, often making a successful defense virtually unthink-
able. Unless the hypothetical defense has a real prospect of succeeding, it remains merely
humorous.
The "Urban Survival Syndrome" defense is likely self-defeating in cases like Osby's,
where a young black male is charged with killing other young black males, because the
defense suggests that the jury should be very careful about acquitting the defendant. The
"syndrome" creates not only a fear of the decedents, but also a fear of the defendant
himself as a member of the vilified and dangerous group. Similarly, the examples given
in the prosecutor's brief in the Grant case regarding the "reasonable militant militia-per-
son" for Timothy McVeigh and the "reasonable former athlete/movie star"--apparently
for O.J. Simpson-hypothesize a self-defense claim by both. See supra note 141. Self-de-
fense was not offered for Simpson and has not been mentioned for McVeigh. Under the
facts of these cases, self-defense claims would be ludicrous.
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syndrome evidence moves beyond support of credibility, a lack of
independent validation should impose an explicit limitation on the
expert's claims.
Also, experts should not be permitted to testify that a
defendant's conduct was "reasonable." The key point in the law of
self-defense is that "typical" or "common" behavior is not the
equivalent of that which is "reasonable."'" Moral values that in-
form the legal definition of reasonableness are not part of a
psychiatrist's or psychologist's expert view; they are built into the
law. An expert's statement that conduct was reasonable provides a
classic example of testimony that incorporates a legal concept used
differently by the expert than it is in the law.4 Nevertheless, a
new blanket rule of exclusion is unnecessary, since the testimony
should not be permitted under the standard analysis of Federal
Rule of Evidence 704(a).
The expert in the Seagroves case, however, did not cross the
line into the impermissible-his testimony was a step removed
from the use of legal terminology, and would appear to be permis-
sible under the Federal Rules or other bright-line prohibitions
against testimony about ultimate mental states.' Whether the
expert's testimony had a decisive impact, or merely provided a
convenient explanation for the jurors who had reached a conclu-
sion of innocence for other reasons, would be virtually impossible
to determine. Even if such evidence was not decisive in the
Seagroves case, evidence of this type is likely outcome-determi-
native in some other cases,47 and effective control of its use is
not easily accomplished.
Moreover, regardless of efforts to limit misuse, cases like
Seagroves' will continue to trouble the legal system because the
central problem lies not in syndrome evidence but in society's
long-standing support for attractive instances of vigilantism.' I
144. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 788-90 (1994).
145. See supra notes 46, 122 and accompanying text.
146. See FED. R. EviD. 704.
147. See Jerry Allegood, Verdict Might Not Quell Feud in Duplin, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 25, 1996, at Al (expert testimony regarding post-traumatic stress dis-
order provided basis for insanity defense of defendant who ambushed and fatally shot his
tormentor in community feud).
148. See Franklin E. Zimring, Hardly the Trial of the Century, 87 MICH. L REV.
1307, 1309 (1989) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLErCHER, A CRME OF SELF-DEFENSE:
BERNHARD GOETz AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988) and arguing that public support for
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believe society's favorable reaction to such cases results from fear
of crime, distrust in courts' and governments' ability to solve the
crime problem and to make society safe, and visceral support for
those who appear to have acted decisively against crime and crimi-
nals. Such a reaction no doubt supported the broad acceptance of
BWS. Although this response to crime is largely understandable, it
is also undesirable, regardless of its form, and should be con-
strained at least to situations where the reaction generally com-
ports with basic'justice, as it does with BWS.
B. The Difficult Task: Drawing Reasonable Distinctions to Admit
and Exclude Classes of Group Character Evidence
Courts, and in some cases legislatures, have developed general
rules for admission of several sorts of group character evidence,
such as CSAAS, BWS, and expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification.'49 Except with regard to eyewitness identification
experts, these rules are shaped roughly by the appropriate eviden-
tiary doctrine and are generally satisfactory despite the critical
influence of politics. Even with regard to eyewitness experts, ex-
clusion may reflect a correct practical judgment regarding the
substantial overall impact on criminal trials if such testimony were
routinely admissible.' In an earlier article I called for an effort
to screen group character evidence in an exacting fashion;... I
now believe that a precise sorting of such evidence is beyond the
capability of courts in any more than rough categorical terms.
Admissibility, if precisely determined, rests on a set of dis-
criminations, each of which requires delicate scientific judgments,
careful conceptualization of the use of evidence, and precise infor-
mation about the validity and impact of the evidence. 5 2 In the
self-help violence against criminals is not a recent phenomenon but is "a standard Ameri.
can enthusiasm").
149. See, e.g., supra note 77 (listing state statutes mandating admissibility of BWS evi-
dence).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 1987) (suggest-
ing that general admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification would
grossly overburden the trial process if permitted in every case where relevant).
151. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 128-32.
152. Decisions on general admissibility and the second order decisions on the proper
form and extent of such testimony require resolution of a set of issues: first, discerning
the jurors' body of knowledge and stereotypes; second, determining what the true nature
of social group action is; and third, gauging accurately the impact of the evidence so that
it does not create equally erroneous stereotypes or prove entirely different facts. A rigor-
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context of ordinary criminal litigation, which occurs mostly in
overworked state courts and relies on individual lawyers barely
adequate for tasks that do not require scientific sophistication,
courts cannot realistically be expected to reach delicate and pre-
cise conclusions in individual cases on such complex issues. Given
these constraints, one ought not object too strongly to categorical
rules that respond to broad social judgments as long as the under-
lying analysis is reasonably honest and takes only limited license
with evidentiary principles. 3
In spite of the difficulties of these precise admissibility deter-
minations, we can hope that judges will sometimes exercise their
discretion and rule against the general trend, admitting, for ex-
ample, expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications when
ous effort to resolve the issues noted above places unreasonable demands on trial courts,
given our inadequate knowledge about public attitudes, the "truth" regarding the contours
of syndromes, and the impact of various types of evidence upon jurors and their reason-
ing processes.
153. Courts presently attempt to "fine tune" the admission of such evidence through
various restrictions on the form of the evidence that may be received. These efforts
should be divided into two categories based on the justification for the restriction. In the
first category are restrictions based on the limits of valid scientific research regarding
group character evidence. Prohibiting the expert from using the term "syndrome," for ex-
ample, may be justified on the scientific basis that the term suggests scientific certainty
which is lacking, at least for most uses in criminal litigation. See, e.g., People v. Peterson,
537 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Mich. 1995) (prohibiting expert from using term "syndrome"). Simi-
larly, prohibiting experts from giving an opinion that a particular person fits within a syn-
drome is justified because experts are, at this point, unable to identify syndromes accu-
rately on the basis of their psychological markers. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d
793, 799 (Minn. 1989) (limiting BWS evidence to a general description of the syndrome
and to the characteristics of a person who suffers from it and prohibiting the expert from
linking the defendant to the syndrome). Thus, restrictions on such broad-based scientific
judgments are appropriate.
In the second category are restrictions based on the anticipated impact of the testi-
mony on jurors. Attempts by courts to regulate the impact of such testimony as best
they can are not improper. If impact is to be the determining factor, however, our em-
pirical knowledge is not yet sophisticated enough to resolve clearly the multitude of is-
sues that would have to be addressed before the conditions of admissibility could be fully
specified. Because precise calibration of impact is likely not possible, any restrictions
regarding the form of the evidence for that purpose would have to be broadly drawn.
By arguing that only broad, categorical rules are practical, I am not taking issue
with the use of Daubert or other tests of scientific validity to screen such evidence re-
garding basic theory and methodology. Indeed, restrictions should be based on the limits
of science. My argument is, first, that when applied to the facts and context of specific
cases, our knowledge is limited and indeterminate despite the continued best efforts of
social scientists and legal scholars and, second, that our current (or future) inability to
fully resolve these uncertainties should not bar admission if the broader issues of basic
scientific validity have been resolved.
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circumstances support special treatment. Although my general view
is that American courts should remain skeptical of and careful
about the admission of syndrome and syndrome-like evidence in
criminal cases, they should not reflexively reject all new group
character evidence. In some areas, the increased use of such evi-
dence should be encouraged, assuming the underlying social sci-
ence research has been proven sound. In other areas, past admissi-
bility decisions should be reversed or admission strongly resisted.
An important determinant of whether expansion into a new area
should be willingly entertained, even if skeptically, or strongly
resisted is the old-fashioned concept of the prejudicial impact of
the evidence: how likely is it that the new form of proof will
encourage the jury to reach a verdict based on who the victim or
defendant was rather than what he did in the particular violent
encounter?
In light of the preceding discussion, I suggest two areas where
expansion of group character evidence and recognition of a true
syndrome may be appropriate in the future. The first area con-
cerns judgments about witness credibility. Currently, jurors (and
judges, for that matter) decide credibility issues based in part on
the demeanor of witnesses. Those judgments are based on social
experience. Although experts cannot yet determine with any cer-
tainty who is telling the truth based on demeanor, they may some
day be able to educate jurors on what factors are more likely than
others to be indicators of truth-telling; they may be able to correct
the erroneous views of the general public about which demeanor
factors are most salient."5 If the scientific research is adequately
developed, this evidence, like expert testimony regarding eyewit-
ness identification, should improve the ability of jurors to evaluate
credibility.
If the validity of these basic concepts can be established by
social scientists, a second task will present itself to scientists, legal
scholars, and courts: finding a form for such evidence that will, on
balance, provide greater benefits than distractions and therefore be
admitted categorically. 5 If a generally acceptable form for evi-
154. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Valid-
ity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157,
1192-97 (1993) (noting the critical point derived from social science research that behav-
iors popularly believed to manifest deception are not in fact the ones that best reveal
deception).
155. I believe the critical problem for eyewitness identification experts remains the
506 [Vol. 46:461
SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND POLITICS
dence regarding credibility markers in demeanor is developed, ad-
missibility should follow. The evidence would be used neither to
diagnose-so the scientific task should not be extraordinarily de-
manding-nor to provide a platform for vilifying a party.
The second area for a potential expansion of group character
evidence relates to the diagnosis of sexual abuse of children using
psychological markers and the observations of physicians. Despite
a history that does not inspire confidence, diagnosis of child sexual
abuse by social scientists may, in the long run, reach a level of
validity sufficient to warrant admission.
Most courts and commentators agree that CSAAS is not a
proper tool for diagnosing the sexual abuse of children.'56 That
does not mean, however, that social scientists cannot, for all time,
diagnose child sexual abuse by relying upon behavioral patterns in
combination with statements of children. Currently, some experts
in the field believe that such a diagnosis is possible where a com-
bination of specific factors are observed.57 Courts should require
the highest level of scientific validation in such situations, since
use of group character evidence similar to CSAAS to "diagnose"
child abuse presents the sternest challenge to scientific research,
given that controlled experiments are not possible. Also, using
science in this way entails the greatest dangers that scientific
claims will overwhelm lay judgments as to the central issue in the
case. Despite these obstacles, social scientists may someday meet
the challenge.
development of a form that presents expert testimony in a way that has fewer negative
consequences than traditional expert testimony but is nonetheless more effective than jury
instructions, which have little impact. See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 49, at 164-66
(summarizing empirical research regarding impact of jury instructions regarding eyewitness
identification testimony).
156. Some authors not only believe that no present expertise allows a confident diag-
nosis of sexual abuse by mental health and child development specialists, but also doubt
that there is hope that such an expertise will develop. See Thomas M. Homer et al., The
Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing is Seeing, 21 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 281, 286-89 (1993) (reporting that experts' conclusions regarding a test case of
alleged sexual abuse were extremely variable and therefore unreliable, and that no basis
was shown for the proposition that experts are specially qualified to diagnose abuse);
Thomas M. Homer et al., Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody
Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made (pt. 3), 26 FAM. L.Q.
141, 162-63 (1992) (discussing a wide range of judgments by experienced and inexperi-
enced clinicians from the fields of clinical psychology and sociology in evaluating whether
child had been sexually abused).
157. See Myers et al., supra note 42, at 73-78.
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Today, on the other hand, courts permit without much analy-
sis opinions rendered by medical doctors that differ little from
those they almost universally exclude when offered by social scien-
tists. A substantial percentage of sexual abuse cases lack physical
markers that are diagnostic.' Nevertheless, doctors frequently
diagnose sexual abuse using historical data to supplement support-
ive but non-diagnostic physical indicators.' American courts
permit such diagnoses,' 6° as well as others based on symptoms
reported by the patient to medical doctors; courts do so because
of a long-standing practice of admitting clinical findings of physi-
cians that cannot be independently established by physical mark-
ers, such as the testimony of doctors in support of pain-and-suffer-
ing claims resulting from soft tissue injuries. Historical results
should not, however, blindly guide future decisions if the science
cannot establish the validity of the diagnosis.' 6'
As argued above, the barriers to admitting syndrome and
group character evidence should be high where the evidence is
used to diagnose criminal conduct or where the strong form of a
syndrome is claimed. In addition, courts should be reticent to
admit such evidence where it provides new or more effective ways
of bringing emotion into the trial-where it gives greater latitude
to vilify or generate sympathy for a victim or defendant,62 and
158. See Jan Bays & David Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually Abused
Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 91, 92 (1993) (reporting that findings diagnostic of
sexual abuse are present in less than 20% of child victims); see also Myers et al., supra
note 42, at 37 (noting that the lack of physical evidence may be due to the nature of
the abusive acts, sexual dysfunction by the offender, or complete and rapid healing).
159. See Myers et al., supra note 42, at 37-38.
160. See id. at 48-51.
161. The Daubert decision may prompt a re-examination of the admissibility of evi-
dence that has been historically received although not shown to rest on a scientifically
valid foundation. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592
n.11 (1993) (noting that newly established admission requirements are not restricted to
"novel" scientific evidence). For example, one court has found evidence comparing hair
samples, which was previously accepted as admissible, to be inadmissible under Daubert's
requirements. See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554-58 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
But cf. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling
that Daubert standards are inapplicable to determination of admissibility of forensic docu-
ment examiner). Broad re-examination of past practices is unlikely, however, for practical
reasons.
162. The more typical problem is the vilification of the victim, in part because of
rules prohibiting introduction of the character of the defendant. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
404. Nevertheless, vilification of defendants can occur indirectly in child sexual abuse
cases through the use of syndrome evidence and under some uses of Rules 413 and 414
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See infra notes 170, 183.
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specifically where it helps defense attorneys persuade the juries to
"dig up the deceased and shoot him all over again.' '""a One pos-
sible way to handle this problem is through the use of categorical
rules to exclude broad types of syndrome evidence for certain
general purposes, such as proving a defendant's mental state.
61
Although not totally misguided, such all approach would likely
prove ineffective in solving the problem. Moreover, the approach
might be too rigid and might exacerbate the basic problem by
suggesting that, if the evidence is not excluded by the categorical
rule, it is admissible.
I believe the task is best handled by application of the well-
established evidentiary principles noted above. First, the validity of
the science must be demonstrated, a requirement that should be
more exacting where the evidence is used to diagnose events or to
establish affirmatively the reasonableness of conduct. Second, the
evidence must refute rather than enhance societal misperceptions.
Third, experts should not be allowed to give scientific statements
on legal and moral issues. Abuses of the law not handled by these
prohibitions should be corrected via the time-tested responsibility
of the judge to exclude evidence that is substantially more prejudi-
cial than probative.
C. The Advantage, Challenge, and Uncertain Consequences of
Acknowledging the Role of Politics in the Admission of Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome Evidence
I now return to a key consideration-the consequences of an
acknowledgment that politics have played a role in shaping evi-
dence law regarding the admission of BWS evidence. I suggest
that such recognition is likely to yield one specific benefit: it will
163. See supra text accompanying note 116.
164. See F'LETCHER, supra note 113, at 254-55 (recommending that psychiatric experts
should not be permitted to testify about issues of moral responsibility, which he would
operationalize by extending Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to the states
and by radically altering judicial attitudes so that judges would generally "become more
restrictive about the kinds of expertise that could inform or advise the jury about matters
relevant to their task of judging responsibility"). However, some categorical restrictions
on the effect of PTSD-type defenses are worth examining because such defenses appear
particularly susceptible to fabrication or misuse of various types. See, e.g., Allegood, supra
note 147 (defendant who ambushed and fatally shot his tormentor in community feud
found not guilty by reason of insanity where only mental disability was post-traumatic
stress disorder allegedly induced by amphetamines).
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inhibit the expansion of the principles developed in battered wom-
an self-defense cases .to more problematic situations.1' Proper
limitation of the doctrines associated with BWS will likely be
aided by an explicit recognition that those doctrines occur as a set
of special evidentiary rules related to violence against women. 66
Society and the law have not dealt well with the plight of battered
women outside the courtroom. With BWS (and some other gener-
al changes in the substantive law of self-defense), rules are being
changed to assist those women who find themselves charged with
killing their male companions.
The social reality relating to violence against women does not
require admission of syndrome and group character evidence in
other areas. I believe that American judges and legislatures will
agree, as long as these new rules may be explained as part of a
solution to a specific social problem rather than entirely neutral
applications of basic evidentiary principles. 67 Recognizing the
political naiure of decisions regarding BWS should inhibit the
extension of similar evidentiary treatment to other areas until
165. Some scholars disagree with my articulated goal of attempting to limit the con-
cepts that benefited battered women to that particular social and political context. See,
e.g., Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 525, 547 (1996) (arguing for a necessary commonality and philosophical link be-
tween the criminal law's treatment of battered women and other socially marginalized
groups).
166. Already, several Federal Rules of Evidence are based on similar categorical anal-
yses. Under Rule 412, most evidence of the consensual sexual activity of alleged rape
victims may not be offered by the defendant, who in other areas is allowed to prove a
relevant trait of the alleged victim's character under Rule 404(a)(2). Similarly, in sexual
assault and sexual molestation cases, Rules 413 and 414 allow admission of evidence of
other sexual assaults that would otherwise be inadmissible under Rule 404's general pro-
hibition against using the defendant's character to prove circumstantially his or her guilt.
167. Despite the fact that judicial decisions reflect political judgments, whether or not
explicitly recognized, see supra note 82, there may be some advantages in overtly political
decisions being made by the legislature. As noted earlier, see supra note 141, in the
recent case of State v. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1996), the prosecution argued that to
recognize an impact of battering on the imminence requirement would undermine the
basic fabric of moral responsibility in the law. Although that claim is overstated, the
prosecution made another more subtle and more defensible point. It argued that if the
substantive law of self-defense is to be changed, the legislature should do so. See Brief
for State at 25-26, Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1. That argument has merit in the sense that the
legislature is more able to declare that a rule is being enacted based on policy judg-
ments, as has occurred with BWS, than the courts, whose lawmaking function is tradition-
ally seen as more limited. Thus, preventing the extension of BWS into unwanted areas
can more easily be accomplished when the legislature authorizes admission of a class of
evidence, even where that enactment is an evidentiary rule, than when admission comes
through a judicial ruling.
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social and political forces demonstrate an equal claim to a change
in the law, which rarely occurs."6
Now is a good time to acknowledge officially that the eviden-
tiary treatment of BWS reflects social and political judgments as
much as (or more than) it reflects evidentiary analysis. 69 This
recognition is particularly appropriate given the growing number
of proposals to change other rules associated with adjudicating
cases involving violence against women. In addition to the broad
acceptance of BWS, recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415 reflect the impact of this political movement. 7
Additional proposed changes include the recognition of new hear-
say exceptions for statements by victims of sexual violence' by
homicide victims who were previously victims of domestic violence
at the hands of the defendant; receipt in domestic homicide
cases of evidence of prior domestic violence perpetrated by the
defendant against the victim; broad admission of expert testi-
mony regarding profiles of those who batter and those who are
battered when offered in prosecutions of the batterer;74 and cre-
ation of a first-degree murder statute for domestic homicides.' 75
168. Candor may have a number of benefits. See Taslitz, supra note 15, at 399-401
(arguing that candor may cause decisionmakers to produce better decisions, as a result of
requiring them to articulate more clearly the basis for their action, and may improve
legitimacy).
169. The political decision, broadly described, is to give the jury the right to make
the moral judgment of guilt in a more contextualized factual setting that is predictably
more favorable to apparent victims of domestic battering.
170. See FED. R. EvID. 413 (allowing, in criminal sexual assault cases, evidence of
defendant's prior commission of sexual assault); FED. R. Evm. 414 (allowing evidence of
similar crimes in criminal child molestation cases); FED. R. Evm. 415 (allowing, in civil
cases concerning sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of similar acts).
171. See Orenstein, supra note 91, at 61-68.
172. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence:
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1463, 1506-16 (1996).
173. See id. at 1488-1506. This result would be reached by defining a new category of
"other crimes" evidence that would be admitted as an explicit exception to the general
prohibition against receipt of character evidence to prove conduct circumstantially. See
FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
174. See Raeder, supra note 33, at 178-87.
175. See Raeder, supra note 172, at 1477-88. Of these proposals, I find most troubling
the recommendation that states create a new class of first-degree murder when the defen-
dant has committed past acts of domestic violence. I believe that American criminal
sentences are not currently too lenient and that new, harsher sentencing regimes should,
in general, be carefully scrutinized. If the increase in penalty for domestic homicide can
be shown to be justified by deterring future deaths or incapacitating beyond their crime-
prone years men who are likely to kill again, then it is proper. If, however, the purpose
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Most of these changes target evidentiary law rather than the
substantive criminal law, but all intend to steer substantive out-
comes in a specific direction. It is likely that many of them will
soon become law. In retrospect, the broad admissibility of BWS,
achieved principally through judicial action, and the implementa-
tion of "rape shield" rules, which resulted principally from legisla-
tion roughly a decade earlier, are now part of a powerful move-
ment. The time has come to recognize that this body of legal
changes is a response to a newly perceived social reality rather
than simply an unrelated and neutral evolution of legal princi-
ples.176
Cases that involve what I have termed "attractive vigilantism"
should be understood, if not controlled, by another type of charac-
terization. Such cases should be recognized for both the tragedy
and the anomaly that they represent. Rather than signifying a
deterioration of society's willingness to impose moral judgments,
defenses based on attractive vigilantism reflect other, more prosaic
concerns. Not guilty verdicts in such cases will occur as long as
society fears senseless violence and as long as defense lawyers can
paint a decedent as deserving of his or her fate. My argument is
not that our most difficult and emotional cases are usually decided
correctly-only that questionable results in some of these cases do
is chiefly to impose a harsh punishment for symbolic purposes, the effort is misguided.
Increasing the number of defendants sentenced to mandatory life without parole or those
eligible for the death penalty has consequences that are far too serious. Men in domestic
homicide cases already are given substantial sentences, receiving on average sentences of
16.5 years in 1988, see supra note 37, and, given our nation's mood, these sentences are
likely to grow longer without the straitjacketing effects of first-degree murder sentencing.
176. One reason I make this suggestion is that I do not support a wholesale change
in the impediments to convictions and, more specifically, the character rules that are now
largely favorable to criminal defendants. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 404 (excluding, general-
ly, evidence of character). How many guilty defendants should go free lest an innocent
one be improperly convicted? The answer to that question is at the heart of our substan-
tive criminal law and of much of criminal procedure. It is also near the heart of some
evidentiary rules, specifically the rules regarding character. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a)
advisory committee note (explaining that the basic rule in most jurisdictions rejecting
circumstantial use of character evidence except when offered by the defendant "is so
deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions").
The erosion of the strong bar against character evidence offered against the defendant,
which began in the area of sexual violence against women and is now moving to domes-
tic homicide and domestic violence prosecutions, may ultimately be generalized. We may
have seen the beginning of the end of the character rules as they have been understood
for most of this nation's history. Perhaps these rules are antiquated and misguided and
should be changed, but I feel otherwise and believe they should be altered only in the
area of violence against women, where the social justification is very substantial.
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not represent a general demise of the justice system or society's
loss of basic values.
Admittedly, the specific benefit of identifying and limiting the
extension of BWS principles to more problematic areas is gained
at a cost; the story of BWS's legal foothold inevitably provides a
model for other political influences to affect evidence law. Political
and social judgments motivate many, if not all, changes in law-
whether they are made by legislatures or courts and whether they
occur in the law of evidence or elsewhere. However, when a court
makes changes based on political and social considerations while
claiming the change is based on a more neutral basis, such as
social science, the court may undercut its claim to legitimacy,
which should rest on bases more neutral than political responsive-
ness.' With regard to BWS, however, any loss of legitimacy has
been small, because the courts are in accord with community
sentiment, and where democratically elected bodies have acted,
they have been in agreement with those courts that broadly admit
BWS.
From a long-term perspective, a more significant danger is
that courts will be encouraged to abandon further their role as a
brake on popular sentiment, becoming even more responsive to
social and political forces and increasingly shaping legal doctrines
to fit majority sentiment while claiming to be responding to neu-
tral concerns. 7 Excessive political sensitivity is already a serious
problem in criminal cases, particularly where the presiding judges
are elected. 9 The ultimate danger is that the popular concern
of the day will dictate not only the content of statutes but also
judicial rulings and caselaw in general."8 Recognizing the role of
177. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 601-02
(1991) (arguing that when properly used, empirical evidence aids the Supreme Court in
exercising its discretion within accepted boundaries and therefore helps protect its legiti-
macy-a matter of concern because the Court is not a democratically elected body).
178. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Ac-
cused, 44 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 1079, 1095-96 (1993) (contending that elective politics are
unlikely to support measures to protect rights of criminal defendants, and courts need to
be conscious of their unique role in providing such protection).
179. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
RV. 759, 760-80 (1995) (cataloging the impact of popular pressure in favor of the death
penalty upon state court judges, most of whom face election either initially or through
retention elections).
180. Mosteller, supra note 14, at 513-15 (suggesting that changes in laws affecting
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politics in altering evidence rules is likely to have a minor effect,
at most, given the powerful political pressures already at work.
At a more general level, my argument that politics have
played a role in remaking certain evidence rules may reflect mere-
ly another postmodem insight, brought rather late to the field of
evidence. No doubt politics in support of a dominant value struc-
ture have always played a major role in the shaping of evidence
rules. Previously, these politics were not recognized as such be-
cause they were couched in the purportedly neutral value system
of a professional elite who professed to seek only accuracy in fac-
tual adjudications. For many like myself, these values not only
seemed to be neutral, but also had the additional benefit of pro-
ducing results generally consistent with traditional liberalism. What
I suggest in this Article may be nothing more than a recognition
that political forces are now openly shaping a field of law-the
law of evidence-where such forces have been previously less
overt.
Overt political involvement is often most apparent when evi-
dence rules affect criminal litigation. Since the making of criminal
law-the determination of who should be punished, how, and for
what types of activity-has long been recognized to reflect political
judgments, a similar role for politics in the evidence law employed
in criminal litigation is hardly shocking. Nevertheless, some may
argue that the basic aspiration of evidence law-the determination
of facts-is distinct enough from the value-laden issue of crime
definition so that, even if political forces play a role in criminal
law formulation, these forces should not be allowed to shape evi-
dence rules. The argument clearly has some merit, but even at the
technical level of distinguishing the functions of the two bodies of
law, it is not sufficient to set evidence rules to one side. In some
types of cases, such as many battered woman self-defense cases,
the most appropriate way to achieve a desired substantive result
may be to admit more contextual information about the defen-
dant. It may be that no substantive change in the law can capture
the complexity of a needed correction in self-defense law as effi-
ciently and accurately as an evidentiary change can.
Even if it is agreed that politics have an inevitable role in
shaping law, and that evidence law is not entirely immune to the
criminal trials are likely to be those supporting crime control in response to popular
furor against violent crime).
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effects of this role, critics of my position may argue that recogniz-
ing a role for politics is only appropriate as an attempt to criticize
and correct the law retrospectively. I appear to do more-to sug-
gest that good politics can turn bad evidentiary principles into
good law and, prospectively, to welcome politics to the task of
shaping of evidence rules.' Critics may contend that even if
one is convinced politics have played a role and therefore that
accuracy and honesty support a recognition of that role," poli-
tics should continue to be resisted, and the appropriate ex ante
position with regard to rule revision should be that politics remain
an impermissible factor in shaping evidence law. I am attracted to
this more negative view, and remain ambivalent that politics
should be welcomed.
The more significant point, however, can be found in my
observation that politics are now a major part of the shaping of
some types of evidence law and my prediction that it will expand
its influence.Y Politics in the near and intermediate future will
likely affect the law through the efforts of victims and other
181. That charge is a possible interpretation of my position that BWS, although meth-
odologically flawed, was appropriately admitted given the social reality of domestic vio-
lence. What I am arguing, however, is that BWS evidence on balance helped produce
more accurate results than would have resulted from its exclusion, given the limits of our
ability to understand and describe social phenomena, the magnitude of the problem of
domestic violence, and the requirement that cases be decided without delay.
182. A retrospective recognition of the role of politics has been very beneficial in the
refinement of BWS admissibility rules. Helpful criticism that explicitly or implicitly recog-
nized the political component of Lenore Walker's initial formulation has come from those
who argue for scientific validity, such as Professor Faigman, see supra notes 66, 68-69
and accompanying text, and those who advocate using evidence rules more instrumentally,
such as Professors Ammons and Moore, see supra note 72. Both argue against a rigid
formulation of a syndrome and for admission of more flexible contextual information.
The end product of both types of criticism may be group character evidence that is more
validly formulated; such a development would also aid additional classes of victims. See
generally supra note 81.
183. A continuing role for politics is virtually assured by Congress' realization, after
enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15, that it can create new rules of evidence
without the prior involvement, let alone blessing, of any professional evidence elite. See
Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 HARV. L. Rnv. 563, 564-69 (1997) (tracing briefly Congress' passage of Rules
413-15, the post-passage submission of the new Rules to the U.S. Judicial Conference,
and Congress' subsequent lack of response to the Conference's advice that the Rules not
be adopted). See also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THm UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THm ADMISSION OF CHARACrER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES, 159 F.R.D. 51, 51-54 (urging Congress to reconsider its
policy determinations underlying the passage of Rules 413-15).
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groups that support greater admission of evidence, often styled as
"truth-in-evidence" movements. Concretely, such efforts are likely
to lead to further admissibility of previously excluded classes of
evidence regarding the defendant, especially evidence regarding
the defendant's character and past bad acts. Indeed, a number of
the proposed initiatives of the effort to curb violence against wom-
en would do just this."M Additional group character regarding
defendants, victims, and witnesses may also be admitted. I expect
that our ex ante perspective will quickly become an ex post per-
spective that must recognize the role political forces have played
in promulgating some new evidence rules, particularly those rules
regarding individual and group character.
If my predictions are accurate, I suggest a strategy for evi-
dence traditionalists: provide the jury with a basis-a context-for
understanding and evaluating these new types of evidence. To
assist with accuracy and neutrality, juries will need a body of
knowledge and methodology to accompany the new types of evi-
dence regarding the defendant's character and past behavior and
to assist them in distinguishing accurate indicators of guilt from
evidence that merely produces prejudice. Some of this companion
information should be group character evidence.
184. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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